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**GROUND DOG DAY: LESSONS DON'T HAVE TO BE
RELEARNED IN THE USE OF DOGS IN COMBAT**

by

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December 2005

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**GROUND DOG DAY: LESSONS DON'T HAVE TO BE RELEARNED IN THE
USE OF DOGS IN COMBAT**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Currently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve the US fighting insurgents. The nature of the fight in highly populated areas negates traditional American strengths in technology and mechanization. One of the potential tools in this fight is the expanded use of military working dogs (MWD), also called war dogs or K-9s. The increased use of dogs on the battlefield has the potential to save lives. The problem is that this lesson seems to have to be relearned with every prolonged conflict the US enters. The delay by the military leadership recognizing dogs' utility on the battlefield has historically cost US servicemen's lives.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether lessons that have been learned could be applied to the current MWD program to enhance the effectiveness of using dogs in combat. The intent is not to convince the reader that every lesson or particular conclusion or recommendation presented is the final solution to creating a "perfect" MWD program. The aim, instead, is to offer a spectrum of options or alternative methods that may be of use to those involved in MWD programs and to suggest areas for further research and exploration.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

High-tech wizardry may have changed the look of today's battlefield, but one thing will never change—the need for early detection of the enemy. For thousands of years, dogs have been in the front of men engaged in battle. Military tradition dictates and demands that they will always be “Forever Forward.” (Lemish, 1996, p. xiv)

Currently, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involve the US fighting insurgents. The nature of the fight in highly populated areas negates traditional American strengths in technology and mechanization. The number of casualties from the conflicts continues to rise everyday and the military leadership continually calls for solutions to the threat that the insurgents pose to American military personnel. One of the potential tools in this fight is the expanded use of military working dogs (MWD), also called war dogs or K-9s.

B. THE PROBLEM

The increased use of dogs on the battlefield has the potential to save lives. The problem is that this lesson seems to have to be relearned with every prolonged conflict the US enters. The reasons why these lessons have to be relearned are numerous but inexcusable, since delays by the military leadership in recognizing dogs' utility on the battlefield have historically cost US servicemen's lives. Little has changed in the fifteen years since MAJ Denzil Frost wrote in his thesis, published by the US Army Command and General Staff College in 1990, that, “The canine's or MWD's nose offers significant potential because of its superior sensitivity to any other sensing device. Unfortunately, the US today finds itself in the same familiar position [with a MWD program not equipped for the current conflict] as it has at similar points in history” (Frost, 1990, p.1).

Jim Pettit, the dog program manager at the US Army Maneuver Support Center and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, echoes Frost's views,

Today and in the recent past the MP dogs have been great in force protection on the gates and health and welfare inspections/customs work, and bomb detection for the President. As listed above the military needs to move dogs forward and put them in useful combat roles as was done in Vietnam. The dog is still the detection asset it was back then. Improvement in training techniques and adaptability of breeds still keeps the dog as the gold standard for detection, tracking, etc. Technology still

isn't there. I have heard technology will replace the dog for 20 years now.
(Taken from a questionnaire response sent to the author by Jim Pettit on
October 3, 2005)

C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether lessons that have been learned could be applied to the current program to enhance the effectiveness of using dogs in combat. The intent is not to convince the reader that every lesson or particular conclusion or recommendation presented is the final solution to creating a "perfect" MWD program. The aim, instead, is to offer a spectrum of options or alternative methods that may be of use to those involved in MWD programs and to suggest areas for further research and exploration.

D. BACKGROUND

An earlier attempt to provide information about the MWD program was undertaken by Denzil Frost when he prepared his 1990 Master's thesis, *A Centralized Source of Information for the Military Working Dog Program*, for the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also used a questionnaire in an attempt to develop more information on the military dog program. MAJ Frost had a problem similar to one I re-discovered during my research. As Frost puts it, "Attempts to locate information about the MWD Program led mostly to military regulations, with very little information about training, management, procurement, or use by the Using Agencies" (Frost, 1990, p. 256). Frost discovered that the responses he received covered the complete spectrum of what was wrong with the MWD Program at the time. He found that it, "...was impossible to establish a consensus of opinion. The Training Section blamed the procurement and management sections for the shortfall of trained dogs, or vice versa, depending on which group was queried" (Frost, pp. 256-257). These issues and others remain present in today's MWD programs.

Another Master's thesis was written on the subject of military working dogs by Lieutenant Commander Mary Murry. Her thesis was entitled, *The Contributions of the American Military Working Dog in Vietnam* dated June 5, 1998 was prepared for the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The following abstract is from LCDR Murry's thesis:

This study investigates the contributions of the Military Working Dogs in Vietnam to determine their significance to the United States' war effort. There is limited written history concerning the use of the Military Working Dogs in Vietnam. The methods and procedures employed in this study data relied extensively on personal military After Action Reports and histories (written and oral) to compile a historical account of the military working dog in Vietnam. The study found that when correctly employed, these animals made significant contribution to the United States' war effort in terms of the saving of lives and in the protection of military resources. However, these contributions could not be quantified therefore assumptions were made as to the effectiveness of the animals. Despite their effectiveness, the scout, tracker, and mine/tunnel dog programs were disbanded at the conclusion of the Vietnam War. This practice of disbanding military working dog programs at the conclusion of conflict is one that has been practiced since World War II. Each subsequent war has necessitated the rebuilding of military working dog programs. Today, only the sentry dogs are still active, having been joined by the relatively new narcotic detection dogs. Future conflicts may necessitate rebuilding the scout, tracker, and mine/tunnel dog programs.

I have found that all of the points that LCDR Murry made in her thesis remain valid today. The ongoing conflicts in Southwest ASIA have renewed some interest in recreating programs similar to those developed in the past. And, indeed, variations on past programs are in development or becoming operational once again.

Fortunately, several books have been published since Frost wrote his thesis, including Lemish's, *War Dogs* that depict the history of the military working dogs. These historical accounts led me down a number of avenues where, like Frost, I discovered during my research that:

A large gap exists between what is known in the research world (science) and what is applied in the 'real world' (art). In other words, no evidence could be found that the art of producing consistent, top quality working dogs was based on scientific principles that ensure repetitive and verifiable results. (Frost, p. 2)

This use of the term "art" led me to create a questionnaire by which to elicit and draw on the expertise of former and current military handlers and dog trainers. I had limited success finding sources of scientific or detailed information about the effectiveness of using and training dogs for combat, so I decided to go to the people who

had first-hand experience themselves. I found through my investigation of the MWD program that certain trends have persisted over time, while other lessons have been lost and are worth recovering.

During my research on the MWD's, I visited the current MWD program, the DoD Military Working Dog Training Center at Lackland AFB. I also had the opportunity to personally visit with Jesse Mendez, former Vietnam scout dog handler and trainer, and correspond with several former and current handlers by telephone and email. From the conversations and emails with former handlers and current handlers and the use of written materials, I developed a questionnaire covering topics about which I felt former and current handlers could provide some insights. I conducted an extensive literature review of every available US military manual printed on the subject of dogs and every civilian book that could be found. This was an attempt to determine the context and history of the current program in an effort to discover how the program evolved to its current state and so that I could collate lessons along the way. This literature review revealed an extensive and colorful history. Military Working Dogs (MWDs) have successfully saved lives during past conflicts, the implication being that they could also do so in today's conflicts.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is an introductory chapter. In Chapter II, I briefly cover the history of war dogs through the US experience in Korea. Chapter III describes US programs since Korea, with a particular focus on the scout dog program in Vietnam. Chapter IV outlines the current MWD program. In Chapter V, I summarize responses to my questionnaire and make a series of recommendations.

E. ASSUMPTIONS

This study assumes that:

1. The information and expertise required to address the problem exists, but is not static.
2. That the amount of information collected by a variety of methods—literature review, interviews, questionnaires, email, and phone conversations—is sufficient to yield valid conclusions.

3. As Frost himself noted, “Expert consensus will yield valid conclusion, even though it is difficult to prove, on a scientific basis, whether an SME [subject matter expert] is right or wrong. If a group of SMEs reaches a consensus on a specific subject, the chance that all will be wrong will be minimal” (Frost, p. 3).

F. LIMITATIONS

1. Pertinent data may not be available, or may be incomplete, due to specific policies of general nondisclosure or for proprietary reasons.

2. Contacting *all* potential sources of information was not possible, primarily due to time constraints.

3. The amount of time that I could spend as an observer at the DoD MWD Training Center at Lackland Air Force Base was limited due funding and time constraints.

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II. HISTORY OF THE MILITARY WORKING DOG

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF MILITARY DOGS

Over thirty thousand dogs have served in the U.S. military, thrust into harm's way and responsible for saving thousands of American lives. Throughout history, dogs have been employed effectively for sentry and scouting duty, finding booby traps, and locating wounded and lost soldiers. Their only reward was merely praise for doing a good job. Having fought alongside humankind in battle, these dogs are the forgotten veterans. (Lemish, 1996, p. ix)¹

Militaries have employed dogs in a variety of roles throughout history. Dogs have been used primarily as defensive weapons; however, attempts have also been made to use them offensively. The use of dogs has changed and has been tailored to each conflict. As Lemish states, "High-tech wizardry may have changed the look of today's battlefield, but one thing will never change—the need for early detection of the enemy. For thousands of years dogs have been in front of men engaged in battle. Military traditions dictates and demands that they will always be 'Forever Forward'" (p. xiv).

B. PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

"The earliest known battle dog was a mastiff type from Tibet that was domesticated during the Stone Age. Persians, Greeks, Assyrians, and Babylonians all recognized the tactical advantage of war dogs and deployed them in great numbers as forward attacking elements" (Lemish, 1996, p. 1). The Assyrians used dogs as early as 2300 B.C. (Thornton, 1990, p. 4). There are records describing one engagement where dogs were used in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). "During the battle of Versella, women led hordes of war dogs against the Romans" (Lemish, 1996, p. 2). "In the fifth century, Attila the Hun understood the advantage of traveling with dogs and journeyed with four-legged sentinels in his conquest of Europe. As with knights and horses during the Middle Ages, canine armor developed, encasing the dogs in battle plates and chains (Lemish, 1996, p. 3). The Italian naturalist Aldrovandus, born 1522, wrote of the

¹ Michael Lemish has been the historian for the Vietnam Dog Handler's Association. He is not a Vietnam veteran or a former dog handler. Lemish's book, *War Dogs: Canines in Combat* is widely regarded as the most accurate and comprehensive book on the subject of war dogs. Given the fact that little has been written about the war dogs of the United States, I have frequently referenced and quoted from Lemish's book. I have done this primarily because of his ability to concisely represent the complicated and ambiguous circumstances that reflect the history of the use of dogs by the military. Lemish's book currently offers the best single resource for understanding the subject.

development of sentry and war dogs. His writings were very similar to those of the United States' Air Force manuals written more than 400 years later (p. 3).

In 1695, the British obtained one hundred savage dogs in Havana, Cuba, and transported them to Jamaica. Here they participated in the Maroon War, a guerilla action fought by renegade African slaves. During the Spanish Morocco War dogs surfaced as tactical decoys. (p. 3)

Napoleon Banaparte, in 1798, used dogs chained to the wall of Alexandria, Egypt for early warning. He understood that the dogs also served as a delaying mechanism if enemy soldiers attacked, since they would have to deal with the dogs on any approach to the city.

With the development of gunpowder, dogs' roles changed from being active combatants to providing auxiliary support for soldiers in the field (p. 4). Yet, at about the same time warfare was becoming mechanized, militaries increasingly became aware of the intelligence of dogs. Europeans showed the most and earliest interest in expanding the use of canines. The same level of interest was not shown at the time in the United States.

America's first war dogs were used by Native Americans to aid in transporting people who were sick or injured. The Native Americans used dogs defensively, not offensively. Early colonists used dogs mostly for hunting, herding, and protection. A law enacted in 1706 declared that people living in the frontier areas should whelp dogs that could be used to aid in the fight against the Indians. Benjamin Franklin first suggested the use of scout and attack dogs in 1755. No one acted on Franklin's suggestions. "John Penn, the grandson of William Penn, who founded Pennsylvania, and lieutenant governor of the colony from 1763 to 1771, also suggested employing war dogs" (p. 6).

Dogs were used on a limited basis during the Civil War. "Officially at least, there existed no organized military dog program for either side of the war....By the late 1800s the military still had not adopted any official war dog program, but the Civil War did plant firm roots for the use of mascots and pets" (p. 8). Confederate and Union soldiers alike adopted dogs they found wandering the countryside and made them mascots or pets.

“Fan, the pet of Captain J.W. Byron of the 88th New York, repeatedly demonstrated her bravery under fire, according to an eyewitness who wrote:

Fan went into every battle, and while the firing was brisk lay down behind a big log or in some other secure place. And when a lull would follow she’d sally out and run along the regiment to see if any of her friends were killed or injured. She was very much attached to [one] man of the company, who during the firing fell mortally wounded. When Fan came up to him she threw herself on him and cried. She wept and licked him, while the poor fellow would throw out his hand to pat her as he feebly exclaimed, “Poor Fan! Poor Fan!” (Thurston, 1996, p. 175)

The 11th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers had a mascot similarly devoted to the unit, so much so that she led the unit before President Abraham Lincoln in a pass in review after the Battle of Gettysburg. “As a permanent dedication to her memory, a cast bronze replica of Sallie stands at the base of the granite monument to the Eleventh Pennsylvania Infantry on the battlefield at Gettysburg National Military Park. It is located near the unit’s actual battle positions on Oak Ridge, northwest of the historic town of Gettysburg” (Libby, 1962, intro.).

It wasn’t really until the Spanish-American War of 1898, that dogs came to be used as a force multiplier. The Americans easily had the firepower advantage over the Spanish on sea and land. “Problems arose when the [American] army began to launch patrols on horseback in hostile territory covered with thick vegetation and narrow paths. Small groups of guerillas set up ambushes and fired from concealed locations upon the patrols before disengaging and melting back into the landscape” (Lemish, 1996, p. 9).

As Edwin Richardson describes in his 1910 book, *War, Police, and Watch Dogs*:

An American officer, Captain M.F. Steele, of the 6th Cavalry, after varied experience of the conditions of warfare in the Philippines, strongly urges that dogs should be attached to the army. He [Captain Steele] says that “dogs are the only scouts that can secure a small detachment against ambush on the trails through these tropical jungles. The bush is so dense that flankers are out of the question, and the trails are so crooked, and over such rough territory, that the leading man at one or two hundred yards is out of sight of the main party. The insurgents, lying in ambush, usually or often let the leading man pass, and open with a volley upon the wagons and main party of the escort. They open from apparently impenetrable jungle, and at a range of from 30 to 200 yards. They fire one or two volleys, then usually run away. Sometimes never a man of them can be seen, and our men have simply to fire into the jungle and trust luck. The

orders at present from the Jifles' superiors are, that the insurrectors shall not attack in parties less than fifty, that they shall attack none but very small parties of Americans, and that they shall always make use of ambuscades." He urges that "the animals—pointers by preference, or hounds—would need little training. Their instinct for hunting and sniffing in every hole and corner would be sufficient to justify their use." (Richardson, 1910, pp. 102-103)

It was said of Captain Steele's dog, Don, that, "Not once was the patrol ambushed with Don on the point" (Lemish, 1996, p. 9). But the U.S. army did not pursue the possibility of using dogs, despite Captain Steele's successful experience.

"Ironically, Col. E. H. Richardson, in a successful effort to establish a military dog program in Great Britain, recounted the efforts of Captain Steele and Don in a magazine article in 1911. The British would then go on to amass thousands of dogs for use in World War I" (p. 9).

C. WORLD WAR I

During World War I, dogs were employed in three primary roles: ambulance services, messenger service, and sentry detail. Some secondary roles included ammunition and light-gun carriers and scouts, and Jack Russell terriers were used to combat the rats in the trenches.

The conditions on the battlefield of World War I created a unique environment with significant areas of "no-man's land" created between trenches of the opposing sides. Since the area between the trenches was so dangerous, dogs worked these areas with success. The Red Cross dogs or sanitary dogs, for instance, would provide the wounded with medical supplies and water, as well as companionship. If a wounded soldier was found, the dogs would act as a guide to bring rescuers to the wounded soldier or guide the soldier back to a field hospital. "In one case a French Red Cross dog named Captain located thirty wounded men in a single day using this method" (Lemish, 1996, p. 13). Another French dog named Prusco located more than 100 wounded men after a single battle. Reportedly, Prusco dragged wounded soldiers to the protection of crates and trenches during his search, before alerting rescuers of the wounded men's location.

Each side trained dogs to indicate the location of the wounded; however, the signal used by each country was different. It was also reported that the dogs could

differentiate between friends and enemies, though there is no proof of this fact. The dogs worked at night and relied on their olfactory ability (Richardson, 1910, p. 76).

The French began using military dogs in 1906, but stopped in 1914 after the Battle of the Marne. The decision was made by Marshal Joseph Joffre, for reasons that remain unclear (Lemish, 1996, p. 14). Some thought he just hated dogs, while others think that the nature of the fighting at that time made their use ineffectual. The French reactivated their program in 1915, calling it the Service des Chiens de Guerre. The program expanded through the end of the war.

Many breeds of dogs saw duty during the First World War. “Bulldogs, retrievers, Airedale terriers, sheepdogs, and German shepherds were used in a variety of roles. Purebreeds did not have any advantage over mixed breeds, and this is probably true today” (Lemish, p. 15). Among other things, dogs were used as draft animals. The dogs presented a smaller target than horses, could operate without a soldier present, and did not consume as much food. Unlike mechanized transportation, the dogs could likewise operate over rough terrain, did not need gasoline, and did not suffer from mechanical failure.

Except for the United States, every country embroiled in the war considered dogs a valuable commodity. When the United States entered the war, few American commanders grasped the advantages of developing the animal to their full potential and needed to borrow them from the French or British. (p. 17)

The messenger dogs achieved a long list of successes in World War I. Each side used dogs to relay messages from unit to unit. There are many stories of dogs successfully relaying messages even under intense fire and after being seriously wounded. In Colonel Richardson’s later writings, he extols the virtues of messenger dogs and comments that they could be trained in just six weeks. These later writings are a contrast to those from his earlier 1910 book, when he writes, “...; but my experience tends to show that too much is expected of the dog, and although dogs are found to be sufficiently intelligent to discriminate direction under difficult circumstances, still the result is too uncertain, and the teaching partakes too much of the trick-training to be of practical use” (Richardson, 1910, p. 90). “Richardson always believed the prime

motivation for a dog should be positive praise and reinforcement. This would be a key element in developing any type of war dog, and one factor not always adhered to” (Lemish, 1996, p. 21).

On April 6, 1917, President Wilson declared war against Germany to keep the world “safe for democracy.” On June 16, 1917 American joined the French and 180,000 U.S. troops were added to the war. “Of all the armies participating in the Great War, only the United States lacked war dogs within its military ranks, with the exception of some sled dogs in Alaska” (p. 21). According to Lemish, several American canine associations tried to persuade the military to adopt a war dog program, but with no success. This may be due to the belief that the war would end quickly with America’s entry.

According to Lemish:

During the spring of 1918, the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces recommended the use of dogs as messengers, sentries, draft animal, and patrol auxiliaries. The proposal suggested that 500 dogs be obtained from the French military every three months. After training, each American division would be supplied with 288 dogs. The program also specified the establishment of training facilities to be built within the United States and the construction of five kennels that could house 200 dogs each. It promised to give the American army its first official canine unit. The hierarchy of the military, after reviewing the recommendations, dropped the plan entirely for unknown reasons. Many years passed before a similar proposal was finally adopted. (p. 23)

Some dogs were sent overseas, but to be trained by civilians. This civilian training meant that the dogs were not exposed to various weapons firing or the impact of rounds in close proximity. Again, Lemish points out, “The deficiency in their training regimen made the animals useless at the front, as they understandably cowered under fire. The same problems would plague many war dogs fielded by the United States in the years to come” (p. 24).

Contrary to Army regulations, mascots were adopted by Americans in France during World War I. Though the dogs were not formally trained, the dogs did play key roles. “Rin Tin Tin, for example, was a German mascot puppy found alone in a trench after an attack by Americans. The dog would grow up to be a matinee idol and added to the folklore and popularity of the German shepherd breed” (p. 25).

Stubby was another famous example of a dog that discovered a sense of duty as a mascot. A number of different books devote several chapters to Stubby's life story. Stubby joined the 102d Infantry which was part of the Army's 26th "Yankee" Division during the summer of 1917. The dog was smuggled onto the ship transporting the unit to St. Nazaire, France in January 1918. One night, Stubby warned a sleeping soldier of an impending gas attack. On another occasion, Stubby the dog attacked a German who had infiltrated into the unit's area. The unit's soldiers fashioned a Victory Medal with five bars to show the dog's participation in each of the unit's offensives. He became known as the "Hero Dog". Stubby received numerous awards and medals and was made a life member of many organizations, including the American Red Cross, the YMCA, and the American Legion. Stubby also met three U.S. Presidents. In 1926, when he finally died of old age, Irene Gevenwilson Kilner, curator of the Red Cross Museum, asked to prepare Stubby for permanent display. He remained at the museum for 30 years before being moved to the Smithsonian Institute (p. 27).

By way of comparison, the Germans sent 6,000 dogs to the front upon the start of the WWI with 4,000 in reserve with their civilian owners. Italy fielded 3,000 dogs for the Allies and the French fielded even more. The British started the war with one dog, but due to the efforts of Colonel Richardson, who later started the British War Dog School (Lemish, 1996, p. 28), the British soon developed a dog program that apparently provided thousands of dogs for the British war effort and also for the efforts of the Americans later in the war.²

Once the war was over, "The French military, then [at the cessation of hostilities] possessing fifteen thousand dogs in its employ, destroyed the animals as its great war machine demobilized. The vast quantities of dogs used by the British, Germans, Italians, and Russians faced the same fate" (p. 29). Significantly, the Germans did not destroy their animals and maintained their program after the war.

In contrast, the US appears to have learned very little. The U.S. military budget declined sharply after World War I and no interest was shown by the military in the pursuit of a military dog program. There were individual advocates but no serious efforts were made through the 1920s or 1930s.

² I could not find an estimated number of dogs fielded by the British.

D. WORLD WAR II

With the emergence of Adolf Hitler as the leader of Germany and his invasions of countries in Europe, it appeared by 1938 that the world would again be engulfed by war.

Several years before the beginning of World War II, the German military authorities, again foreseeing an approaching conflict, began a canine force to be used in the front lines of warfare. As a result of this planning, the Nazis had, in 1939, what was probably the largest, best trained, and best-equipped canine army in the world. It was estimated that they had 50,000 Pinschers, Sheepdogs, Alsations (German Shepherd dogs), and Rottweilers trained for active service as pack-carriers, first-aid scouts, and messengers, while others of the same breeds were well trained for carrying out reconnaissance with patrols. When the shooting began, these specially trained dogs quickly found the positions of the Allied forces and, thus, frequently made it possible for the Nazis to annihilate these positions. The majority of these dogs were trained at the Military Kennels at Frankfurt, established in 1934, where some 2,000 animals were constantly being trained (Sloane, 1955, pp. 386-387).

The U.S. was also aware that the Germans supplied hundreds of dogs to the Japanese military authorities. According to Downey, the Germans supplied Japan with, “25,000 trained war dogs before Pearl Harbor” (Downey, 1955, p. 5).

However, some Americans *were* clearly paying attention. For example, an article in the January 1940 issue of *Infantry Journal* described the war dog’s potential in battle and used information and photographs from the German and Japanese armies (Lemish, 1996, p. 31). Just as Captain Steele argued several decades previously:

In Panama and the Philippine Islands on jungle trails, where flank security is impossible of achievement because of the dense growth, dogs used as advance guards and scouts could ferret out an ambush before it could take effect. Their ability to work in tangled terrain would be an invaluable security measure in jungle operations.

Considering the many ways in which the dogs may benefit the soldier we should begin now to breed and train suitable types of dogs for the various functions of probable employment, to develop the dog’s most favorable characteristics, and to expand the number of uses wherever such employment will relieve a man. This program cannot be fully realized after M day [the first day of a war]; it should start at once. Our liaison with dogdom should be much closer than that implied by the common name for the soldier’s identification tag (p. 31)

In 1941, the military did obtain 50 sled dogs from the Byrd Antarctic Expedition. The dogs were sent to Greenland to help locate and rescue crashed pilots. No official dog program existed yet. The catalyst to start a program came from a fear. The foundation of this fear, “consisted of saboteurs, fifth columnists, and enemy aliens, within the continental United States, who could potentially damage the rapidly expanding industrial plants with strategically placed explosives or incendiary devices,” and this fear, “became an even greater reality as Japanese submarines operated off the Pacific coast and German U-boats increased their activities along the Atlantic seaboard” (Lemish, 1996, p. 34). Various dog associations around the country pushed the use of sentry dogs. One widely circulated selling point was that, “A single dog could replace eight sentries, freeing them for more important work” (p. 34). Yet, on the day after Pearl Harbor, the entire U.S. Army library contained just one book about dogs: a field manual on the care and transportation of dogs in Arctic regions (p. 35).³

In March of 1942, several months after Pearl Harbor, the War Department appointed a civilian organization, “Dogs for Defense,” as the official procurement agency for U.S. war dogs:

Without cost to the Government, that organization recruited, at first trained, and shipped to military centers the dogs which formed the K-9 Corps. Dogs for Defense, Inc. staged highly successful publicity and financial campaigns which made its accomplishments possible. Carrying on throughout the war, it continued to supply thousands of dogs to the Armed Forces, launched a war dog breeding program and acted as the Government’s agent for the demobilization of the K-9’s. Without Dogs for Defense, Inc., there would in all likelihood have been no K-9 Corps (Downey, 1955, p. 7).

The war dog reception (K-9) centers fell under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Quartermaster General. The K-9 centers trained dogs in one or another of the following duties: interior guard duty, which included sentry and attack; and the tactical service, which included messenger, scout, and casualty duties. Early in the efforts, the DFD concentrated on defensive roles for dogs, not offensive or tactical roles. The Coast Guard

³ This fact was verified by simply conducting a search of past US Army manuals, the earliest was the *FM 25-6 – Dog Team Transportation*.

began its program in July of 1942 for sentry and beach patrol. This program was started to aid in the policing of the thousands of miles of coastline, military installations, and “war plants” in the United States.

Although, the Coast Guard and the DFD programs experienced disappointing early results with training the sentry dogs, the program continued to expand. Soon tactical roles for the dogs were envisioned and a directive was issued to all the service branches “to explore the possibilities of using dogs advantageously in the various activities under their control” (p. 40).

On March 13, 1942, the Army transferred its authorization for 200 trained sentry dogs to the Dogs for Defense. “It [March 13, 1942] marks the first time in the history of the United States that war dogs were officially recognized” (p. 21).

Problems that developed in the DFD program continue to plague current dog programs. For instance, the dog trainers who volunteered to help in the effort were amateurs as well as professionals. The dog training was initially scattered among several kennels throughout the country because no single kennel was capable of accommodating large numbers of dogs at one time. “Soon it became apparent that this widely scattered and loose-knit system was neither altogether efficient nor economical. While training specifications for sentry dogs had been set up by DFD, a more standardized procedure would be required, particularly if training were diversified to include other types of war dogs” (p. 21). Another problem that faced the DFD program was the lack of personnel, since expert trainers were too few and scattered across the country.

By December 30, 1942, the Quartermaster General notified the members of DFD that the U.S. Armed Forces would require 125,000 dogs for the war, though by war’s end, the actual number of dogs enlisted into service ranged between 17,000 and 25,000 for the U.S. (p. 22).

Given these numbers, the military classed 32 breeds and crosses as war dogs in its Technical Manual 10-396 (1 July 1943). The list then was pared down due to scarcity of certain breeds, experiences during training, and various experiments. The military and DFD tried to standardize procedures for training and procurement, but the changing requirements and need for public participation complicated the efforts. The curtailment

of certain breeds caused problems with some members of the public who were eager to enlist their animals to support the war effort. Many misunderstood the reasons that the military declined their animals for service. The DFD procurement problems were compounded, meanwhile, by sudden initiatives by the military. One such initiative was that of the M-dogs. This program called for smaller dogs such as Cocker and Springer Spaniels and Dachshunds to counter the threat of non-metallic mines that were being introduced by Germany in North Africa (Downey, 1955. pp. 25-33).

According to Downey, in the *History of Dogs for Defense*:

The new mine was slowing the Allied advance....Alert keen-nosed animals were taught to point an anti-tank or anti-personnel mine by sitting down from one to four paces in front of it. In training, they were given an electric shock when they walked into a trap, demonstrating to them that there were objects in the ground that would hurt them and that they must shun them.

The idea of M-dogs was ingeniously derived from the observation that squirrels can find a nut they buried month earlier, or dogs a long-cached bone. Similarly, dogs tested at the camps were able to indicate where mines or other objects had been buried. At camp and in rear areas, the M-dogs performed excellently. Both the British and Americans trained and sent out units of M-dogs. The British Royal Engineers, trying the dogs at the front, found that they located at best only 51% of the mines planted and suffered many casualties. The dogs proved to be too seriously distracted by the dead and debris of a battlefield to function well. The American unit, sent to Italy, accomplished nothing whatever and was reported for the poor discipline and low morale of its personnel. Its failure was not the dogs' fault (Downey, pp. 32-33).

The M-dogs worked on a six-foot leash and were also trained to indicate mine-free areas. The Army deactivated the units since a detection rate of less than 90 percent was unacceptable. The Russians reportedly had an M-dog that found 2,000 mines in eighteen days. The dog was used to de-mine hundreds of railroad tracks and several key airports.

The Russians also trained dogs to conduct anti-tank missions by carrying bombs under attacking tanks. The idea was that once the anti-tank bomb was under the tank, it and the dog would be exploded, theoretically destroying the enemy tank. The problem developed when the dogs began destroying Russian tanks instead of the German tanks. It was then discovered that the training methods used were the cause of the problem: though

the dogs were conditioned by having them to search for food under Russian tanks, the Russian tanks ran of a different fuel than the German tanks. The dogs were able to differentiate between Russian and German tanks due to the type of fuel and so they ran under the Russian tanks on the battlefield.

A similar US program was proposed to destroy bunkers along beaches. The dogs would be equipped with explosives and then trained to run into enemy bunkers, where the explosives would be detonated. This plan was rejected due to the difficulty of training the dogs to differentiate between bunkers with friendly and enemy personnel. Interestingly, current reports indicate that the Israelis have programs that use dogs as “smart” bombs.

Another ill-conceived dog program involved training packs of dogs to attack and “kill”. Walter B. Pandre, a civilian, claimed he could accomplish this for between 20-30,000 dogs. Due to problems and delays, the military officer assigned to oversee Pandre called for an army dog trainer to help with the program. The Army trainer accomplished in weeks the basic obedience that Pandre had been unable to accomplish in months, though the idea of assault dogs working in packs itself turned out to be “not practical.” The program failed to produce the effects desired and the dogs did not demonstrate the “ferocity or intent...to do any bodily harm” (p. 57). The dogs, even after training would not attack without direct supervision and reinforcement of a handler. They also became easily distracted by environmental variables, such as small animals. Later demonstrations continued to fail to meet expectations, and as the military officer overseeing the experiments remarked,

In my opinion it [the demonstration] would be convincing to a person without knowledge of both tactics and dogs. To me the performances of the animals with one exception appeared artificial and forced and with one exception I do not believe I saw anything that could be developed in something of military value (p. 57).

The DFD launched the DFD Breeding program in the summer of 1943. The program emphasized the importance of carefully breeding selected top dogs that possessed traits desired in their offspring. The program required volunteers to assume the expense of raising the puppies until they were one year old. At one year, the DFD inspectors would classify the dogs into one of three categories: (1) Accepted for the

Armed Forces; (2) Suitable for the Seeing Eye program; (3) Offered as a gift to the breeder (p. 33). The drop in demand ended the breeding program on December 15, 1943.

By the end of 1944, the number of Armed Forces' preferred breeds was down to five: German and Belgian Shepherds, Dobermans, Collies, and Giant Schnauzers, plus crosses of those breeds (Downey, p. 34). Most of the dogs were doing scout duty by this time. "In 1946, the German Shepherd was named by the War Department as the official U.S. Army dog" (p.34).

The Marines were the first of the services to show interest in dogs and to incorporate their use in their manuals. The use of dogs in jungle warfare had been suggested in the 1935 revision of the *Small Wars Operations*, authored by COL Victor Bleasdale, published by the Marine Corps Schools. In Chapter 24 of the manual COL Bleasdale wrote, "Dogs on Reconnaissance: Dogs have been employed to indicate the presence of a hidden enemy, particularly ambushes" (p. 59).

The Marines started developing their dog program in December 1942. Their initial efforts were disappointing mostly due to problems with the trainers, but with continuing efforts most of these early problems were eliminated. One problem was the initial trainers had trained dogs in civilian life and did not appreciate the unique challenges experienced during combat. It was determined that a Marine dog handler should be someone, "...who could scout and patrol on his own and simply used the dog as an extension of his own talents" (p. 62). The Marines focused their training on scout and messenger dogs, noting that since, "the Marine Corps is strictly a combat organization, it was felt that time should not be wasted on training dogs unless that training contributed to directly killing the enemy or to reducing Marines casualties" (p. 61).

The Marine war dog training camp was located at New River, presumably North Carolina, and commanded by Captain Jackson Boyd. From his experience with trainers and handlers Boyd observed that:

Men who have associated with animals have that indefinable ability to read their minds and understand them are the most successful. A high percentage of them come from farms where they have handled hunting

dogs and farm stock....In general it may be said that through all his training, the man gives orders to his dog; once trained, the dog gives orders to the man.

The dogs are not to be considered as a new weapon; they have not replaced anyone or anything. They have simply added to security by their keen perception, and their use should be limited to situations where that increased perception is of service. Where a man can function satisfactorily by his own intelligence and perception, the dog is superfluous.

On the other hand, it has been found that the dog's care and feeding present a very minor problem and add little to the burden which already exists for an outfit in the field. The dog can thrive on the biscuits and canned meat in the field ration. He needs no shelter beyond that provided for a man, and a dog can safely drink any water not deliberately poisoned. His medical care parallels a man's (Downey, pp. 54-55).

All dog teams had to complete basic training which included basic obedience training. Once the basic training was completed, the dogs were selected for specialized training. "Higher rating in intelligence, willingness, energy, and sensitivity were required for scout and messenger (13-week course) than for sentry dogs (8-week course)" (Downey, 1955, p. 56).

No dogs were trained just for attack. Dogs were taught to mistrust anyone but their master and the natural tendency to attack by certain dogs was not discouraged. Several dogs saved their handlers in combat by tackling the enemy. "But attack dogs as such were not desired by combat troops—they were too vulnerable. Sending them to charge the enemy was, in the opinion of a Marine captain 'just a waste of a good dog'" (p. 56).

Silence was clearly impressed on scout dogs. Sternly scolded if they barked, they learned on scenting an enemy to alert their handlers unmistakably but quietly. Some stood tense, others crouched suddenly. Some pointed like bird dogs. With some their hackles rose or a low growl rumbled in their throats. They worked both on and off leash, but the former was preferred because it gave closer control (Downey, p. 56).

The training of the handlers became as important as that of the dogs. Again, Downey describes the situation facing the services—both then and now:

That man failure meant dog failure was axiomatic but not generally appreciated at first. Unless handlers were capable and willing and

physically able to stand tough campaigning, it was no use sending a scout dog platoon to the front. The Marines understood that sooner than the Army which accounted for the former's greater success in the earlier Pacific operations. To quote Captain Boyd again: "Something was wanted which would help in direct contact with the enemy. It soon became apparent that if the war dog was the answer, the important thing lay in the selection of the type of man to handle him—the type of man who, dog or no dog, makes an excellent Marine, capable of scouting and patrolling on his own, the dog merely an animated instrument to increase his radius of perception (p. 57).

In sum, the Marines trained their own war dogs and organized them and the personnel handling the dogs into platoons, regularly attached to battalions or regiments in combat.

The Army got off to a much bumpier start. One initial difficulty had to do with the assignment of Quartermaster Corps personnel to the K-9 Corps.

Quartermaster personnel consequently manned the scout dog platoon. Their QM insignia prejudiced field commander who did not believe service force men were likely to be trained for jungle patrols. That estimate was correct in some cases. Ultimately the Army saw the light and infantrymen trained as scouts were assigned as handlers, with the outfits redesignated from Quartermaster to Infantry Scout Dog Platoons (p. 57).

By V-J Day, September 2, 1945, six new Scout Dog Platoons had been organized, trained, and were about to graduate.

As described by Downey,

At the camps scout dog platoons were regularly organized and equipped before proceeding to the front as a unit. A First Lieutenant commanded and the remainder of the personnel was non-commissioned: One Technical Sergeant, four Sergeants, and fifteen Technicians, Grade 5, who were the dog handlers. The Table of Organization called for 27 scout dogs. Armament was the carbine and pistol or revolver. Six jeeps with trailers were authorized. Gas masks for men and dogs and all the regular dog equipment—leashes, brushes, veterinary supplies, and so on, were furnished (p. 58).

The dogs were not effective on the initial amphibious assaults. The dogs could handle being under fire, but their senses were of little use in such an extreme, dynamic environment. The dogs worked best at night to warn of Japanese counter-attacks and once the beachhead had been secured, the dogs' abilities were readily demonstrated (p.

80). The deciding factor on effectiveness seemed to have been the training that the dog team received. The experiments performed showed that dogs needed to be trained to tolerate artillery fire. Most had been trained around small arms fire, but not under artillery-type explosions. These training factors were identified by handlers in the field and the information was relayed back to the training programs so they could adjust accordingly.

The K-9 Corps contributed significantly to the war effort in the Pacific Islands during World War II. As a regimental commander on a Pacific Island reflects about the contributions made by the K-9 Corps:

‘The dogs have made over 100 patrols to date with Infantry troops, ranging from five-man reconnaissance patrols to combat patrols of a reinforced rifle company. Length of patrol extended from one to five days...It is significant that during this period not a unit suffered a casualty from enemy ambushes or snipers when a scout dog was being used on the point of the patrol’ (Downey, 1955, p. 7).

The Americans faced dense jungles where the trails were tunnels through vegetation. If the soldiers did not use existing trails then they laboriously had to create new ones. The risk of being ambushed in this environment was extremely high, especially since the Americans were attacking islands that had been occupied for a period of time by the Japanese. The Japanese had the advantages of surprise, prior knowledge of the terrain, and prepared defensive positions. The scout dogs took some of these advantages away from the Japanese:

Yet when a scout dog and his handler were at the point of the patrol, then it was different. A keen canine nose caught the Jap scent anywhere from a score to several hundred yards away. The dog froze into rigidity, an almost inaudible rumble in his throat. The patrol halted while scouts wriggled through the jungle to the flanks and dealt with the enemy machine gun covering the trail, or the patrol leader sent for a mortar section, perhaps by messenger dog, to blast out the ambush. Sometimes a muzzle would point up a tree. The Jap sniper, hidden in its branches, had made himself almost invisible to human eyes by painting his body green....The dog continued to point. So Yank sub-machine guns sprayed the tree with lead, and the sniper’s body hurtled to the ground or hung limp from the belt that had bound him to the trunk.

Now and again the dogs failed. But this sentence keeps recurring in reports on war dogs platoons by the division to which they were attached: “No Patrols led by dogs were fired on first or suffered casualties” (p. 81).

According to Downey, the scout dogs’ successes in the Pacific Theater began to earn them a significant reputation, which then required the Staff to protect the platoons against over-estimates of their abilities (p. 91). The reports state that dogs could detect enemy from 60 to 1000 yards depending on various environmental conditions and the dog team. Earlier, most people believed that dogs could not be used in the Pacific theater because of disease and parasites in tropical climates. Also the reports in 1942 of disappointments in North Africa added to doubts about their potential use. Fortunately, these fears were proved wrong through the dogs’ actual performance in the Pacific.

Orders were issued by the Staff of the Pacific Theater in a training circular sent to all divisions operating within the Pacific. A précis of the guidance, as put together by Downey, is:

No individual, it directed, will attempt to touch or feed a scout dog, nor will he speak, whistle, lunge at, or in any manner, either by voice or gesture, attempt to attract the dog’s attention.

Dogs give silent warning in the following manner: by lunging on their leash, pointing in the manner of a bird dog, or by raising the hair on their back and neck. They do not bark and seldom growl.

The handler is the sole judge of what the dog can do. He will not be ordered to work a dog if he says that the dog cannot work.

One factor, such as the wrong direction of the wind, will cause a dog to be useless on a mission.

Dogs work best for from 4 to 8 hours. If a mission requires a night vigil all night, it must have two dogs.

The use of scout dogs is a matter of common sense, mixed with a fair understanding of animals.

These dogs are not super-weapons nor will they work miracles. They have been trained for special work which they can do with the help and understanding of all concerned, and will more than prove their worth by giving timely warning of the approach of the enemy. (p. 92)

One example of why the scout dog platoons began to develop such a favorable reputation was the performance of the 28th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon: not “one of the

more than 800 patrols led by its dogs was ambushed” (p. 99). The 26th Scout Dog Platoon had a similar record, but according to Downey the 26th almost did not have the chance to enter battle due to prejudice against the use of the scout dog platoons. Many people were prejudiced against the use of dogs, believing the dogs were not going to be effective and would cause an increased loss of US lives. According to Downey, many thought that in, “...modern warfare they [dogs] were a hairbrained novelty, a probable nuisance, and a distinct liability. Griping extended from operations staffs down through the rank and file. Dogs were one of those wild ideas dreamed up by the chairborne brigades back in Washington and wished on troops on the line” (p. 99).

Orders were given by higher commands for dogs to be used in combat operations. They may well have saved thousands of lives. The problem is, it is difficult to quantify the exact number of personnel that were saved in a manner likely to convince the critics and prove the scout dogs’ benefits to the infantry patrols. Because of the orders to use the scout dogs, the 26th Scout Platoon demonstrated its valor and capabilities as shown by the awards and medals that it received. The 26th Scout Platoon’s personnel were, “...awarded one Silver Star, eight Bronze Stars, and seven Purple Hearts, two with Oak Leaf clusters (the last-mentioned decorations was for wounds; none of the men were killed in action). All members were given the prized Combat Infantryman Badge. The platoon received a unit citation from the 31st Division and another from the 6th Division” (p. 107).

During the 26th’s last few months of the Pacific campaign, there were reports that the Japanese made particular efforts to kill the scout dogs. The Japanese were observed to pass up chances to shoot American soldiers, instead concentrating fire on the K-9s.

Without question, the dogs proved invaluable aids in the “cave clean-ups” that followed major offensives on an island. The caves had to be cleared to ensure that small groups of enemy were not behind American front lines where they could create trouble and kill US personnel. Even though the dogs had not been specifically trained for this task, the adaptability of the dog teams proved they could execute this new role.

As for Japanese war dog units, the Americans did encounter several of them. One unit seemed to use small dogs that turned and ran back when they encountered American troops. Several reports guessed that the Japanese would estimate the location of the U.S.

units from the length of time the dogs were scouting and the direction from which they returned. The Americans, however, soon used these dogs to guide them to the Japanese positions.

The Japanese scout dog programs seemed to have other problems, too. Most of these appeared to stem from errors in tactics, training, and procedures, rather than from the capabilities of the dogs. The Japanese scout dogs, "...worked off leash and about fifty yards ahead of the point, the dogs were sighted by American who thus learned the Japs were close at hand. Even if a Jap dog was not seen, he lost the value of surprise for his masters, since unlike a well-trained K-9 he was apt to bark" (p. 97).

At the close of the war, the US military had to decide what to do with the dogs that it had recruited. The military attempted to return most of its K-9 veterans to a civilian role. This decision was ambitious and not easy. According to Downey, "four platoons were designated to be retrained in the postwar Army. Their dogs include fine animals kept for breeding purposes" (p. 108). The big challenge came in determining how to demobilize and disperse the remaining dogs. The US military had control of approximately 8,000 dogs at the end of World War II (Downey, 1955, p. 108). Many dogs were returned to the owners who had donated them for service. Some donors, however, no longer wanted them due to a "change of circumstance" while the dog was at war. Some dogs came from kennels and had no owners.

According to Lemish:

In April 1945, the War Department stated that the dogs would be disposed of through one of the following methods:

1. By issue to the Seeing Eye, Inc., as a prospective Seeing Eye dog.
2. By issue to a military organization as a mascot.
3. By making available to the servicemen dogs they had handled in the service.

4. By sale through negotiation of the Procurement Division, Treasury Department. (Lemish, 1996, p. 142).⁴

E. POST-WORLD WAR II AND KOREA

After World War II, the dog programs all but disappeared. Recommendations were made by various individuals to continue working on the various dog programs that had been used during World War II, but they were seldom implemented. When the Korean War began, the dog program in the military consisted of one active scout dog platoon (26th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog).⁵

The Quartermaster Corps did maintain a procurement program through the Army Dog Association, which listed private breeders who had animals they would make readily available to the military when needed. However, because of a lack of demand the Quartermaster Corps lost interest in the procurement of dogs and the program was quietly terminated in 1950 (Lemish, 1996, p. 150).

Training also became an issue and no one wanted the responsibility, mostly because of lack of resources after the war. On December 7, 1951, dog training was transferred to the Military Police Corps and the 26th Scout Dog Platoon moved to Fort Carson, Colorado. Sentry Dogs became the focus since the country was at peace and scout dogs were “no longer required”. The program was then transferred to the Chief of Army Field Forces in 1954. The shifting of responsibilities resulted in a lot of confusion,

4 Before the dogs could be returned, they were “demilitarized”. This “reprocessing” took almost as long as the original training. The dog was re-trained to not be a “one-man” dog, and reoriented to the sights and sounds of American towns. Dogs were trained and continually tested to ensure that any aggressive tendencies were eliminated to the extent possible. Only a few dogs proved to be too aggressive to be returned. Unfortunately, many dogs had diseases that could not be cured and were destroyed to prevent any spread of disease.

The chance to provide a home to a surplus war dog was popular. A total of over 15,000 adoption applications were received by the DFD. The applications kept pouring in years after the last dog had found a new home. The dogs were sent to their new homes accompanied by a collar, a leash, an honorable discharge certificate, and the Army manual War Dogs. The manual was to serve as an instruction manual to help the new owners better understand the dogs. Of all the dogs “demilitarized,” only four had to be returned to training camps due to behavioral problems.

⁵ I could gather little information on the Korean War efforts. The only source that I could find was a short chapter in Lemish’s book, *War Dogs* and a few articles from a few military journals. I was fortunate to interview Captain Haggerty, a gentleman who has been running a prominent, civilian dog training business since his military service. He did not serve as a dog handler in Korea; however, he did conduct a patrol with a dog team which led to his later reassignment to the Army Dog Training Center in 1956. He was the Commanding Officer of two scout units, the 26th ISDP, at Fort Benning and at Fort Ord from 1959 to 1961. He later served as instructor of Sentry Dogs at Fort Gordon and as Liaison Officer between US Occupation Forces, Berlin Germany and the Berlin Police Department which had 120 dogs at the time.

yet this also did seem to matter since the military's attention was on nuclear confrontation, not on conflicts that might require tactical uses of dogs.

When the Korean War began, the only dogs available for service were those of the 26th Scout Dog Platoon. In fact, "For its duration in Korea the platoon was never sent into reserve" (p. 155). The platoon was also never supplied with all of its authorized equipment which added to the challenges facing the unit.

According to emails I received from Theodore D. McKelvey, who was a member of a dog unit in Korea that, "was formed and trained 'in Country' within range of enemy artillery," the unit was formed based on recommendations from T/Sgt Sheldon. The commander had some understanding of the performance of dogs in World War II and was looking for similar capabilities for his unit in Korea. The dog unit was not part of the official military war dog program, but a combat unit's own dog program within the 1st Cavalry Division. A brief history of this Tactical War Dog Platoon, 7th Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division can be found on the US War Dog Association Webpage.

T/Sgt. Sheldon said he volunteered for duty in Korea to escape marital difficulties at home. After enduring the required refresher training, Sgt. Sheldon ended up in 'Dog' Co., 7th Cav Regt. After sharing a fifth of whiskey with his company commander one evening, T/Sgt Sheldon got permission to develop the nucleus of a K-9 group. A trip to Pusan was authorized so T/Sgt Sheldon could acquire, at his own expense, the needed tools of the trade. He returned to the front lines with dog food, choke chains, leather leashes, leather harnesses, leather saddle bags (fashioned by Korean artisans) and bowels to feed the dogs. T/Sgt Sheldon was very persuasive in gaining support for his project.

Dogs needed for this startup effort were bought, begged, borrowed and stolen from the Korean civilian population. Platoon personnel were volunteers, friends of T/Sgt. Sheldon in 'Dog' Co. All activity/training was authorized to take place only during times when the unit wasn't engaged in active combat with the enemy. Our training as handlers was very much like what you might see on current TV programs on the subject.

After the period of training had proved to the upper command that this was a desirable tool, the unit was transferred from Dog Co. to Regimental Hq. & Hq. Co., and was led by 1st Lt. Ted Cook, who undertook the job in addition to his original assignment. A period of more formal training was scheduled, and was to span about a month in duration. At that time additional personnel were authorized, and recruited by the existing platoon

members. I was a member of “C” Co. at that time and was recruited by Pvt. James D. Matty, Snowshoe, P.A., who I had befriended on board ship. The deal as proposed to me included a month free of combat to train the unit to a degree T/Sgt Sheldon considered combat ready. (McKelvey, 2005)

Even with these challenges, some basic policies emerged during the Korean War. The dog teams worked mainly on night patrols and were given 24 to 48 hours’ notice of an expected mission. The notice was to allow the handler and dog to prepare and meet with the patrol members so the dog could become more familiar with their individual scents. This time also allowed the dog handlers to brief the patrol leaders and members on the dog’s capabilities and limitations so they knew what they could expect.

In Korea the dogs again proved their worth, as Bert Deaner noted in a report dated February 1953:

The dogs could scent best on level terrain. Mountains and hills tend to make the wind swirl, and an alert at one hundred yards from the enemy in these locations was considered very good. Still, there were times when the dog did not scent until thirty feet from his quarry. It was also difficult for the dog to scent someone on higher ground than the patrol, since scent often rises like smoke. But although the dog might not pick up the scent due to the terrain, his keen sense of hearing would also provide an alert—perhaps not as reliable, though (Lemish, pp. 157-159).

According to Lemish:

One thing was for certain: The Chinese did not like the American dogs. Many handlers found out that in close-quarter fighting, the Chinese or North Koreans would try to kill the dog immediately....By all accounts, the success of ambush and reconnaissance patrols at night struck a certain fear in the Chinese and North Koreans alike (p. 158).

The limitations and capabilities of the dogs paralleled those discovered in World War II. However, there were concerns about the utilization of dogs as seen in a memo from the Seventh Infantry Division, which states, “Several instances have been noted wherein maximum benefit was not obtained due to improper utilization of the dogs and a lack of understanding as to their capabilities and limitations” (p. 160). Success was determined by the team’s ability to work together. As Lemish quotes a former scout dog handler, Robert Kollar, “You can have the best dog in the world. But if the guy on the other end of the leash doesn’t understand his dog, cannot pick up the subtle alert, then someone is going to get killed.”

The Korean War also highlighted some other aspects of using dogs in combat. Even after training, dogs could differ greatly on what they alerted on and how they displayed their alerts. Dogs of the same breed would scent from the ground, while others favored airborne scents. Some dogs would alert to suspicious sounds while some would not and would instead check for any type of movement (pp. 160-161). It was the handler who had to determine and “read” his dog through his understanding of that particular dog.

After the Korean War, the Army closed the training facility at Fort Carson, Colorado. The Army at this time, “cited little need of the animals for its own use and said it wished to demobilize the entire canine force” (p. 163). The reason seems to have been economic, even though it cost only about 55 cents a day to maintain a dog. The Air Force, meanwhile sought to continue its sentry dog program in order to secure airfields, equipment storage facilities, and, specifically, missile sites. While the Air Force expanded its program, the Army scaled back its program, until the 26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon (IPSD) was once again the sole remaining Army unit. The platoon was based at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1958, the Air Force took ownership of the US military effort vis a vis dogs, when it established the Sentry Dog Training Branch of the Department of Security Police Training at Lackland Air Force Base, near San Antonio, Texas. Because the Army Quartermaster Corps was unable to procure the number of dogs required for the Air Force program in June 1964, the Air Force took over the responsibility of procurement as well.

The Army at this point had to purchase its dogs from the Air Force. The procurement of adequate dogs of high quality continued to be an issue due to the competition from police departments and security firms for the best qualified dogs.

F. CONCLUSIONS

1. The US military has continually been reluctant to use dogs in combat or in the military. While other militaries have successfully exploited the capabilities of dogs, the US did not grasp the benefits early in any conflict. The US depended on other countries for the capability during World War I. Even thereafter, other countries maintained their dog programs as they prepared for the next war.

2. The training methods to adequately develop an effective program have not always been clearly understood by those who implement the programs. This has been demonstrated by the consistent lack of success in the early stages of a dog programs. Usually, there are too few qualified trainers or a lack of trainers and others that are realistic about what can be achieved.

3. Finding qualified experts has been an issue throughout US history. Each conflict produces a cadre of experts who could be used to further develop dog programs and improve their effectiveness. However, the military typically deactivates successful programs at the conclusion of a conflict.

4. The use of dogs in combat seems to improve and develop with each conflict, but the lessoned learns in the past have to be relearned due to lack of experienced personnel deactivation of programs.

5. Military leaders rarely seem to sufficiently appreciate the capabilities that dogs can provide or what it takes to develop those capabilities. If military leaders clearly understood the tactical advantages that dogs can provide, programs would be maintained since they are relatively inexpensive. Instead, the default focus is on technological and equipment improvements.

6. Procurement of animals with the required qualities is a continual problem. Since the programs are not continually maintained, an adequate and consistent procurement system is not kept in place. No program has had the quality or numbers of dogs, handlers, or trainers needed once the military leadership decides to once again use dogs in combat.

7. Dogs enhance the capabilities of dismounted patrols in combat. This has been demonstrated by hundreds of personnel accounts throughout history. The desire for this capability has led some units to develop their own programs in the field.

8. Scout dogs and sentry dogs have made the most significant contributions to the US military in combat. The US history of successfully using dogs is predominately in these areas through the Korean War.

III. THE VIETNAM DOG TEAMS

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAMS USED IN VIETNAM

The United States conducted the Vietnam War via the use of massive firepower that was intended to overwhelm the enemy's will to fight. Yet, even though massive firepower was used, Soldiers and Marines still had to walk through the jungle and find and fix the enemy in order to destroy him. The problem was that the US was fighting on unfamiliar, foreign soil against an enemy that fought in a manner that made engagement by our preferred methods—and superior technology and firepower—difficult. Also, prior to the arrival of US troops, the enemy in Vietnam had combat experience on the same terrain, having already defeating the French. The jungle provided the concealment that allowed the VietCong (VC) to attack US patrols and then virtually disappear without a trace. The freedom of action that the VC enjoyed in conducting operations had to be challenged in order to curb the rising US casualties as the US became more involved in the war.

Significant American involvement in Vietnam began around 1960. The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV), “recommended the establishment of a military dog program for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Some American advisers were familiar with the British use of dogs to put down the Communist insurrection in Malaysia.” (Lemish, 1996, p. 167). The US military advisors hoped that the British successes using dogs in Malaysia could be duplicated by the Americans and ARVN. According to Jesse Mendez, who acted as one of the American scout dog advisors to the South Vietnamese as part of the MAAGV program, the program was plagued by problems from its inception. In an earlier thesis written by Mary Murry, Mendez provided the following information: “The Vietnamese viewed dogs as a source of food and deliberately assigned soldiers of poor performance to the handler program. Due to limited resources, the ARVN forces could not and would not provide nutritious diet to the dogs and many suffered and even died from malnutrition” (Murry, 1998, p. 1). Additionally, Lemish notes, “in the years that followed, even with support from the US Veterinary Corps members, nearly 90 percent of the ARVN dogs’ deaths would be attributed to malnutrition” (p. 169). In September 1964, the ARVN had 327 dogs and by

1966 the ARVN had only 50 scout and 80 sentry dogs (p. 172). The ARVN also did not have a single veterinarian on staff. Also according to Murry, “many of the dogs that did survive the initial training phase suffered a high casualty rate due to the abbreviated training and lack of ARVN understanding as to the correct employment of the animals” (pp. 1-2).

The problems that were generated by the abbreviated training were quite obvious to the American advisors: the ARVN were employing the dogs improperly. The ARVN commanders did not, or would not; understand the capabilities that the dog team provided to a patrol. According to Mendez, for instance, the ARVN would place sentry dogs on patrols. The sentry dogs were extremely aggressive and trained to bark on alert. This meant that many of the ARVN patrols locations were compromised by the dog teams or that the dogs attacked fellow patrol members. As the word filtered from the patrols to other ARVN units, the dog teams became even more unwelcome. However, the advisers kept recommending that the dogs be used, so they were, but their ability to make a contribution to the patrol was minimized by the manner in which they were used.

When we first got there we had a heck of a mess. The Air Force had trained many sentry/attack dogs and some were being used by the ARVN infantry units out in the field. These dogs would bark on patrol missions posing a serious problem. On top of that, they wanted to attack and chew up the friendly patrol members. The only type of dog that would work out on patrol was a silent scout dog. It took a while to get these dogs exchanged out. Eventually we got trained dogs to each of the five ARVN infantry scout dog platoons spread out across each Corps area. (Murry, p.34)

Mendez would accompany many of the ARVN patrols in an attempt to maximize the dog team’s capability, but found that many patrol leaders did not trust the dog and did not want the dogs or the American advisors on the patrol. “In the fall of 1961 MAAGV recommended that 468 sentry dogs and 538 scout dogs be sent to RVN. These dogs were purchased privately, since the US military did not possess the required number in its inventory” (Lemish, 1996, p. 169). This showed that, once again, the US procurement process was not prepared for the numbers of dogs and handlers required during a war.

According to Mendez, few of the advisors had served in Korea and had little combat experience prior to Vietnam. The MAAGV program reveals that the Army’s lack

of institutional knowledge. While those who implemented the programs, such as Jesse Mendez, were extremely knowledgeable, many of the leaders based their decisions on a set of assumptions that may or may not have been correct. Assumptions, such as the notion that the South Vietnamese would embrace the use of dogs once their capabilities were demonstrated to the South Vietnamese commanders, proved to be false; few Vietnamese commanders wanted to use dogs on the patrols. Many commanders thought of the dogs as food, not as a combat multiplier. The US advisors also assumed that the Vietnamese would properly employ the dogs once they were trained. This assumption also proved to be false. According to Mendez, the South Vietnamese took trained sentry dogs on a few patrols with disastrous results. The sentry dogs either barked and revealed their position or attacked fellow patrol members.

Even with the setbacks demonstrated by the use of scout and sentry dogs by the ARVN, there is evidence of some early successes. The memorandum included in Appendix A is the guide for scout dog platoons provided by the Office of Senior Advisor in Vietnam. This guide was released as an attempt to enhance the effectiveness of the platoons and outline the requirements for a successful program. The items in the guide are reflected in the earlier military dog manual, *FM 20-20: Military Dog Training and Employment*, dated April 1960. They were also included in the *FM 7-40, Scout Dog Training and Employment*, dated 1973. The wording is somewhat different, but the general principles remain the same. For instance, one key rule states, “The dog must be trained for only one job.” Another point of interest is that the reward system for the dog was to be based not only on “praise and petting,” but also by accomplishing a mission.

At the same time, scout dog teams proved their worth. “The guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong were taking their toll on the American forces, and it became apparent that additional measures had to be taken to slow the casualty rates within the infantry. The answer would be the reactivation of the scout dog program” (Murry, 1998, p. 35). The US military had a tremendous problem procuring an adequate number of dogs. One reason was that the German Shepherd Club withdrew its support when a rumor circulated that dogs were not being adequately received in Vietnam and that a shipment of dogs had been sold as food. While the rumor was never confirmed, the damage to the program’s reputation added to the difficulties of procuring quality animals.

At this point, the Air Force still had the responsibility of procuring the required numbers for the Department of Defense. The US was already using sentry dogs in Korea, Japan, and Thailand at the beginning of the Vietnam conflict. In 1965, “the director of security and law enforcement for the air force believed that the tropical climate would be too oppressive for the animals and they would be ineffective. Obviously, he had not been informed that ARVN forces were already using German shepherds...” (Lemish, 1996, p. 173), once again demonstrating that the decision makers and the military in general did not understand the capabilities of dog teams and their ability to adapt to the environment. If the decision makers had been informed about past dog programs, then they would have known that dogs had been used in tropical climates during World War II.

Once an appreciation for the potential of dogs to save American lives in Vietnam was finally realized, a number of different military dog programs were initiated. The military working dog programs and dog teams developed the five categories of:

1. Sentry – extremely aggressive dogs used by Military and Security Police for physical security of general storage yards, airfields, ammunition supply points, petroleum storage areas, food storage areas, docks, and convalescent centers. Eventually their aggressiveness led to their replacement, the patrol dog.
2. Scout – used by Infantry and Military Police to detect primarily any human scent while on patrol and trained to operate silently. They were usually the lead element of a patrol of infantry. They were also used as flank and rear security. They also proved useful for supporting outposts and ambush sites, as member of reconnaissance teams, and in the search of hamlets. Scout dogs were also trained to detect snipers, wires, booby traps, and mines, and other enemy locations.
3. Tracker – used by the Infantry to follow a particular scent to locate the enemy or sometimes friendly locations. The teams assisted US combat units in maintaining contact with the Vietcong in jungle areas.
4. Mine/Tunnel – used by the Infantry to detect mines and explosives as well as determine the location of enemy tunnels. They had some successes, but unfortunately they were not “a foolproof detection system.”
5. Narcotics – used by the Military and Security Police to determine the location of hidden narcotics (Thornton, 1990, p. 5-6).

“At the height of the conflict, the United States had some 6,000 MWDs in its world-wide inventory of which over 1,100 were in Vietnam” (p. 5).

While all of the dog programs in Vietnam had numerous successes, I will focus on the scout dog program in order to limit the scope of this thesis. Fortunately, many of the lessons learned by the other programs are reflected in the scout dog program, and, in addition, the US had prior experience in developing scout dog programs, though again many of the lessons from World War II and Korea had to be relearned during Vietnam.

By 1965, the US decided to begin a more aggressive, offensive role in Vietnam. This meant an expansion of US forces to be deployed to Vietnam.

For the Vietcong this made little difference in their tactics. Since the Americans had intervened, they always attacked when everything was to their advantage. A quick strike and they melted back into the jungle or countryside. The VC ambushes on American patrols increased dramatically. Trip wires, bamboo whips, and punji pits took their toll both physically and psychologically. The Vietcong were everywhere—yet often nowhere to be found (Lemish, p. 182).

The US used the World War II tactics of heavy firepower, whereas the Vietcong fought using guerrilla tactics. A tactical solution was thus needed to counter the increasing number of American casualties. As Jesse Mendez says, “Ever since the Vietnam War began, Charlie has been hitting only when everything has been to his advantage.” The Army reactivated its Scout Dog Program in 1965 in the hopes that this would help minimize the Vietcong’s advantages. The scout dogs would alert to any unfamiliar odor, mostly in the air but also on the ground. Along with scent the dog could use its other senses to detect and alert to possible dangers. The specific capabilities varied with each individual dog and handler. Official Army reports noted that in ideal conditions of wind and terrain, the scout dog in Vietnam was easily able to detect personnel 500 meters away (Murry, p. 46).

Jesse Mendez redeployed from his position as an advisor on scout dogs to the ARVN just in time to participate in the reactivation of the Army’s scout dog program at Fort Benning, Georgia. Mendez was a primary trainer in the 26th IPSD at Fort Benning from 1966 to 1969, when he retired from the military. Initially the 26th IPSD (the personnel listing is included in Appendix B) was to undergo a one-time expansion to support the war. However, the Army later identified that the requirement had been underestimated and thirteen infantry scout dog platoons and three Marine platoons were

added to the force structure. This was the first time since World War II that the Marines were expected to use scout dogs, since only the Army had used scout dogs during the Korean War.

Due to the success of the scout dog program demonstrated by the Marines and Army, the Air Force began its own scout dog program at Lackland AFB. Fort Benning could not support the Air Force program due to the short notice of the requirement and the concurrent level of demand for scout dogs from the Army and Marines Corps. As successful as the Air Force was with sentry dogs, its scout dog program was plagued by commanders who did not understand the new scout dog's capability. The lack of understanding meant that the dogs were used as sentry or patrol dogs and were not used to maximize their scout dog training (Lemish, p. 190).

The mission of the scout dog was to support tactical units and to give silent warning of any foreign presence outside the main body by:

1. Warning against ambushes.
2. Warning against snipers.
3. Detecting enemy hideouts or stay behind groups.
4. Detecting enemy caches or food, ammunition, and weapons.
5. Detecting mines and booby traps.
6. [Early] warning of the enemy's approach to ambush patrols [US patrols with the mission of ambushing the enemy] and [US] listening posts (Murry, p. 42).

Not surprisingly, the expansion of the scout dog program strained the procurement process's ability to acquire the sufficient numbers. "This problem could be attributed to a high rejection rate of 30 to 50 percent of the potential canine recruits. Competition with civilians and private security firms also hampered military procurement" (Lemish, 1996, p. 184). The rapid expansion also led to a shortage of qualified handlers and instructors. The author of the book *Dog Tags of Courage*, John Burnam, was trained "on the job" to be a dog handler and recruited to a dog platoon while he was an infantryman in Vietnam. This was due to the lack of qualified, trained handlers available to fill the personnel shortages at the time. Even though Fort Benning

was producing a number of trained handlers and dogs, the risks inherent to continually operating at the “point” of a patrol and the expansion of the program led to an overall shortage of personnel. Also, the scout dog handlers were volunteers and known hazards of the job limited the number of volunteers:

...[Their] three to five day missions involved silently walking ahead of a unit and providing warning to the men of possible ambushed and booby traps. The shortage of scout dog teams and their “as needed” assignment did not allow time for the handler and his dog to train with the unit they were supporting. Often times there was little warning given to the handler as to the mission on which he was to embark, making a dangerous task that much more psychologically demanding (Murry, p. 43).

As Jim Black, a former dog handler from the 37th IPSD notes:

It was a nerve-wracking and dangerous assignment some have equated with defusing unexploded bombs. Dog teams combat-assaulted by helicopter into enemy-infested jungles and immediately began leading the way down well used enemy trails with fresh tracks in front of them.

Often a handler jumped off a chopper and reported to the CO, then went directly to the point. Moving quietly through enemy-held territory when the “pucker factor” is high is not the best place to strike up a conversation. Only after a few days in the field did the regulars actually get to know the handler and the dog by name. Most handlers had only a nodding acquaintance with the men of the host unit (Murry, p. 45).

Initially, only 40 percent of the instructors at Fort Benning had been to Vietnam (p. 184). This lack of experience about the conditions in Vietnam led to some of the initial problems with the program. Fortunately, instructors with Vietnam experience, like Jesse Mendez, clearly understood the role that the new handlers would have to fill when on patrol.

The complexity and challenges of training dogs and handlers cannot be overstated. As Sgt. Charles Paris, a training NCO from the 26th IPSD, put it, “These dogs are just like humans. Some are quick to learn and others are slow-witted. Some cooperate and others are stubborn. You don’t know what to expect until the dog and man start working together” (Lemish, p. 185).

Some of the early problems were that the dogs were not accustomed to shotguns and flares. The heat was also a problem until the dogs acclimatized to the environment in

Vietnam. Dogs required more water than a man operating in the same conditions. Another risk generated by the scout dogs on a patrol was a concern that they:

...instilled a false sense of security and overconfidence in the men on patrol. Scout dogs were suppose to instill confidence, and they did, but the confidence sometimes overwhelmed the men's good judgments, making them careless. They began to feel invincible which, of course, they were not. (Kelch, 1982, p. 38)

Even with these problems, 1st Lt. Ronald Neubauer noted, "Although people have to be convinced that the dogs will be a positive use to them, once a unit uses dogs, they always come back for more. At times, requests had to be turned down because of the limited number of dogs available" (p. 185). Neubauer's observation is reflective of the earlier comments made by handlers and advocates from World War II and the Korean War. As Neubauer also pointed out, "It has been estimated that well over two thousand Marine lives have been saved since the insertion of the 1st Scout Dog Platoon into Vietnam" (p. 187).


Far more reminiscent of WWII experiences was Neubauer's statement that, "We never had a patrol ambushed that has had a dog along. The dog has always managed to sniff out the danger and force the VC to show his hand before he wanted to" (Lemish, p. 186). But also, as in WWII, not all field commanders understood how best to take advantage of scout dogs.

Nevertheless, the Vietnam scout dog and handler training program that was executed at Fort Benning has been described as a very successful program. One way to quantify its success is to use the summary (Figure 1, 2, and 3) created by Jesse Mendez. His summary includes over 1,100 monthly After Action Reports (AARs). These reports are entitled, "Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations" (Figure 4 and Figure 5 are examples of these reports from the various dog units that operated in Vietnam). Mendez's summary illustrates the large number of patrols that were accompanied by scout dog teams. The fact that the Vietcong placed a considerable bounty on each dog speaks to their effectiveness. The bounty was collected if the Vietcong soldier turned in one of the scout dog's tattooed ears as proof. The Vietcong also had a standing order that if a scout dog team was encountered, the dog should be shot first and then the handler because of the capability that the dog represented. Jesse Mendez makes it clear that his

report does not include all of the available data, but is the result of his best efforts to compile the data from numerous visits to the National Archives and other sources. Mendez has not found any indications during his extensive research that anyone, beside himself, has made an effort to collect the dog unit data from Vietnam into one document.

U.S. Army K-9 Ops (Scout, Combat Tracker & Mine/Tunnel) V N				
	Scout Dogs	Combat Tracker	Mine/Tunnel	Total*
Enemy KIA	3630	165	24	3819
Enemy MIA	332	25	8	365
Enemy POW	1174	31	17	1222
Enemy Detainees	1000	84	23	1107
AK47	1802	64	2	1868
AK50	22	2	1	25
SKS	566	397	1	964
PPS	1			1
M1's	16	1		17
Carbines (US)	71	1		72
Carbines (Russ)	1			1
Pistols (Russ)	1			1
Pistols (US)	2	1		3
Pistols (unk)	17	9	1	27
Shotguns	55	1		56
Shotguns (unk)	326			326
Ammo (unk) - rds	149698	2319		152017
Ammo AK47 - rds	243543	12090		255633
Grenades	137	3	56	196
Explosives - lbs	2021	7		2028
Det Cord - ft	5352			5352
Blasting Caps	14675	55		14730
Snipers	6	1		7
Snipers	269		2	271
Bamboo whips	73			73
Booby traps	1161	159	139	1459
Punji pits	181		39	220
Mines AP	52	6	32	90
Mines AT	49	6	3	58
Claymores	66	13		79
VC-NVA packs	764	95		859
Equipment (unk)	5000			5000
Documents - lbs	284	108	20	412
105mm - rds	36	6	4	46
60mm - rds	1868	28		1896
82mm - rds	2597	21		2618
75mm - rds	148	2	1	151
155mm - rds		6	2	8
81mm - rds			51	51
AKammo- rds			80	80
C-4 - lbs			40	40
Rockets (war)	51364			51364
Bunkers	12818	915	97	13830
Tunnels	704	99	260	1063
Caves	517	99	20	636
Base Camps	1119	116	15	1250
Huts	580	27		607
Caches	877	2	29	908
Spider holes			30	30
Rice - lbs	1178080	35023	52020	1265123
Corn - lbs	7195	1		7196
Salt - lbs	4284	40	330	4654
Food stuffs	151	150		301

* NOTE: These figures subject to increase as all data has not been located and researched; there are further docs which exist and will affect these s!



Mr. Jesse S. Mendez
 1205 Bismark Dr.
 Columbus GA 31907




Figure 1. Page 1 of Jesse Mendez's Results

MISSIONS - U.S. Army Scout Dog Operations 1966 - 1972 VN

Combat	1122
Recon	13831
Ambush	12774
Outpost	3317
Search/Clear/Destroy	37624
Village Search	1451
Long Range	35
Perimeter Patrols	4465
Road Clearing	1567
Combat Assault	1318
Base Defense	329
Blocking Force	179
Med. Cap.	33
Rat Patrols	38
VCI Opns	2
Sweeps	453
Combat Tracker Support	61
Sniper Team	2
VA Capture	12
Other	4916
	=====
Total*	83509

Missions K-9's

<u>Scout Dogs</u>	<u>83509</u>
<u>Mine/Tunnel</u>	<u>2196</u>
<u>Tracker</u>	<u>2359</u>
	=====
<u>Total*</u>	<u>88064</u>

data subject to increase as all records/files/reports have not been located and researched

Figure 2. Page 2 of Jesse Mendez's Results

CASUALTIES

DOG HANDLERS KIA-VN

USA	221 (Spec Forces 2)
USMC	28
USAF	10
USN	2 (Seals 1)
	===
Total*	261
1975 45 Mayaguez rescue	3
	===
Total*	264

U.S. K-9's KIA - VN

USA Scout Dogs	228
USA Sentry Dogs	7
USA Combat Tracker Dogs	5
USAF Sentry Dogs	14
USMC Scout/Mine Dogs	32
USMC Sentry Dogs	8
unit unk.	9
	===
Total*	303

Enemy (Credited to U.S. Military Dogs)

<u>US Scout Dogs</u>		<u>US Mine/Tunnel Dogs</u>	<u>US Tracker Dogs</u>
KIA	3630	24	165
WIA	332	8	25
POW	1174	17	31
Susp	1000	23	84
Total*		<u>6513</u>	

Figure 3. Page 3 of Jesse Mendez's Results

The scout dog program created and utilized some important concepts. Former handlers credit these for the high level of success of the program. The Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations is one such concept. It was a simple easy-to-use form that allowed results to be collected. This form provided a means to gather data on a variety of items, such as the number of days that the dogs from a platoon supported units, the types and number of patrols, the medical status of the various dogs, and any benefits derived or lessons learned due to the presence of a scout dog on the patrols. The examples illustrated in the following figures were not selected for any particular reason, but were pulled as random examples from Mendez's collection of 1,100 of these monthly reports.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

MONTHLY REPORT OF SCOUT DOG OPERATIONS					RCS: AVHOC-7	DATE 10 Jul 70
THRU: G1, 1st Cav Div (AM) ATTN: G-3, Doctrine & Training APO SF 96190		TO: Commanding General HQ USAFV ATTN: AVHOC-OS APO 96375		FROM: Commanding Officer 34th Inf Plt (Scout Dog) 1st Cav Div (AM) APO SF 96190		
1. MONTH June 1970	2. SDT AVAL 15	3. SDT OP 15	4. AUTH STR PERS 28 DOG 28	5. ACTUAL STR: PERS 26 DOG 20		
6. HANDLER KIA 0 WIA 0 HCSP 2 LIM DY 0 TNG 0 NO DOG 0 REPL RQR 5			7. DOG KIA 0 WIA 0 SICK 4 BAD 0 TNG 0 NO HANDLER 5 REPL RQR 0			
8. MISSIONS						
SEARCH 49	AMBUSH 15	RECON 37	OUTPOST 0	FERT PTL 3		
ROAD CLEARING 2		OTHER BUNKER SEARCH 4		TOTAL 110		
9. SCOUT DOG TEAM SUPPORT DAYS 94						
10. SCOUT DOG ALERTS:						
a. Warning of enemy ambush 1, occupied base camp 0, occupied bunker 4, cave 0, sniper 0, tunnel 0, other 5. (VC radio; KIA; trails)						
b. Warning of enemy booby traps 0, caches 3, mines 0, unoccupied base camp 0, unoccupied bunker 2, unoccupied cave 0, unoccupied tunnel 0, other 4.						
c. Warning of enemy movement toward friendly ambush 0, friendly outpost 0, other 0.						
11. DIRECT RESULT OF SCOUT DOG TEAM ALERT: EN KIA 16 WIA 3 PW 0 WPNS 6 ARMY 2 B-40 rockets; 1 M-3. SUPPLIES 1 ammo cache, documents, 3 small med packs						
12. REMARKS OF PLAT COORDINATOR: (11 Cont'd - Supplies) 4 Tons rice; 27 Tons medical supplies cache.						
13. REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER:						
14. NAME AND GRADE PLATOON COMMANDER: HARRIS W. HUBER, 1LT			15. SIGNATURE: <i>Charles W. Huber</i>			
16. NAME AND GRADE OF REVIEWING OFFICER: JAMES J. THOMAS, CPT			17. SIGNATURE: <i>James J. Thomas</i>			

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Figure 4. Example of a Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations

MONTHLY REPORT OF SCOUT DOG OPERATIONS				RCS: AVHCC-7		DATE 31 Jul 69	
THRU: CO, 1st Cav Div (AM) ATTN: G-3, Doctrine & Training APO SF 96490		TO: Commanding General HQ USARV ATTN: AVHCC-OS APO 96375		FROM: Commanding Officer 34th Inf Plt (AD) 1st Cav Div (AM) APO SF 96490			
1. MONTH July	2. SOT AVAL 25	3. SOT OP 15	4. AUTH STR PERS 28 DOG 28	5. ACTUAL STR: PERS 30 DOG 27			
6. HANDLER KIA WIA HCSP LIM DY 1 TNG 5 NO DOG REPL RQR B.L. 1		7. DOG KIA WIA 1 SICK 4 BAD 1 TNG 4 NO HANDLER REPL RQR					
8. MISSIONS							
SEARCH 54	AMBUSH 8	RECON 18	OUTPOST	PERI PTL 2			
ROAD CLEARING		OTHER Blocking Force 9 Bunker Search 3		TOTAL 94			
9. SCOUT DOG TEAM SUPPORT DAYS 87							
10. SCOUT DOG ALERTS:							
a. Warning of enemy ambush 2, occupied base camp 1, occupied bunker, cave, sniper 3, tunnel, other.							
b. Warning of enemy booby traps, caches 2, mines, unoccupied base camp, unoccupied bunker, unoccupied cave, unoccupied tunnel, other. Used Trails 3, Workers (IG) 1							
c. Warning of enemy movement toward friendly ambush, friendly outpost, other.							
11. DIRECT RESULT OF SCOUT DOG TEAM ALERT: EN KIA PW WPNS SUPPLIES							
12. REMARKS OF PLAT COMMANDER:							
1. Our AO seems to be experiencing a lull in fighting. Enemy activity and contact has been sporadic and small for the most part.							
2. Concerning the five (5) dogs on Medical Hold: SHERA - Broken Foot MAX - Growth on Eye MAJOR - IHS CASEY - Puncture wound in Foot BENNO - WIA, Foot							
13. REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER:							
14. NAME AND GRADE PLATOON COMMANDER: RENDER D. DENSON, 2LT, Infantry				15. SIGNATURE: <i>Render D. Denson</i>			
16. NAME AND GRADE OF REVIEWING OFFICER: JOHN H. DAMEWOOD, MAJ, INF, S - 2/3				17. SIGNATURE: <i>John H. Damewood</i>			

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Figure 5. Example of a Monthly Report of Scout Dog Operations

Another item of interest is the Operational Readiness Test (ORT), (see Appendix A). According to Mendez, the ORT was one of the keys to the success of the program. It was used to evaluate a scout dog team. in a number of realistic scenarios that had been created based on experiences from Vietnam. Evaluators were independent of the dog program and were instructed regarding the standards by which each team was to be evaluated. The evaluators, student handlers, and instructors knew that this evaluation or test was the last chance to identify problems before having to face the real dangers in Vietnam, so the evaluators, student handlers, and instructors who participated took the ORT very seriously.

From all accounts by former scout dog handlers, the training conducted at Fort Benning was, "successful due in great part to the outstanding training received by

handlers and dogs alike at Fort Benning” (Murry, 1998, p. 40). During my visit with Jesse Mendez in Columbus and Fort Benning, Georgia, he recounted that many dog team members, upon completing their requisite combat tour in Vietnam, volunteered to finish their Army tours as instructors at Fort Benning. Their primary goal was to inject realism into the training. As the primary instructor who developed the scout dog curriculum and authored the program of instruction, Mendez is credited by many with having been a major force in instilling realism into the training.

Mendez based the training on his experiences walking patrols in Vietnam as a military advisor with the ARVN. He even helped develop a training area that was a replica of a Vietnamese village, complete with live farm animals. Training patrols were also very long in order to develop the team’s stamina and to ensure the handler understood how to recognize fatigue and heat exhaustion in the dog and himself. Mechanized infantry units at Fort Benning also assisted with the training. The dog teams would learn to mount and ride inside the armored vehicles and then practiced dismounting and working an objective area. The training exercises consisted of a long movement in the vehicles, firing from the vehicles, reacting to ambushes while moving to an objective, etc. Even helicopter support was incorporated. The helicopters would shoot blank rounds from above their positions to simulate combat conditions experienced in Vietnam. The teams were trained to travel in all military vehicles to include helicopters. The teams even qualified to rappel from helicopters. Mendez also conducted a HALO parachute jump with a dog to test that capability. In short, diverse and realistic training was critical since a dog team could be called to support any unit in Vietnam immediately upon graduation.

The availability of infantry and other combat arms units at Fort Benning facilitated and provided essential support for various aspects of training. Many times, according to Mendez, the dog teams would support other training conducted at Fort Benning, such as at Ranger School. Hy Rothstein, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and former Special Forces Battalion Commander, remembers having to lead a patrol to which a scout dog was attached during Ranger School in 1974. He was evaluated on how well he incorporated the dog team’s capabilities into the patrol. Rothstein said that the dog team was very effective during the training patrol.

Due to the successes of the scout and sentry dog programs in Vietnam, the military began exploring expanding K-9 roles and exploiting the capabilities of dog teams in combat. Some of these programs developed problems similar to those experienced when Pandre was awarded his contract in WWII, while others were quite successful.

For instance in 1969, the US Army Limited Warfare Laboratory (USALWL) decided that something like M-dogs from World War II might be useful in Vietnam. Research had been conducted on using dogs to detect mines at the British War Dog Training Center and at the Stanford Research Institute after World War II. Although results of the British and Stanford experiments were not encouraging (p. 198), mines and booby traps still proved a constant menace in Vietnam. On roads and in open areas, mechanical mine detectors were effective, but in the jungle these devices were not useful. The USALWL contracted a civilian company to establish a mine detection program.

The civilian company that was contracted by USALWL was called Behavior Systems, Inc. (BSI) which, according to Perry Money, a former Marines Corps handler of a BSI dog, deployed 56 Army dogs in 1969 and 28 Marine Corps dogs in 1970. The training doctrine was written and administered by two civilians who, at the time, held Master's Degrees in Animal Behavioral Psychology. BSI initially trained fourteen dogs to detect mines, booby traps, and trips wires, and another fourteen to detect and locate tunnels only. Each dog produced by BSI cost approximately \$10,000 (Lemish, p. 201). According to Mr. Money, "Their primary focus was on a dual system called "conditioned reflex and positive reinforcement." BSI civilians traveled to South Vietnam with the Marines and their new dogs.

The BSI program led to the formation of the 60th Infantry Platoon at Fort Gordon. Its formal designation was the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog) (White, 1969, p. I-1). The BSI mine dogs were assigned a variety of missions including Reconnaissance in Force (RIF), sweeps, search and destroy (clear), land clearing operations, and road sweeps (p. II-2). The handlers would make clear to the support unit leader the dog team's capabilities and limitations prior to the mission. The handler would also inform the leader that the dog should not be made to walk a tiring distance, i.e., two or more kilometers, before the dog was committed to an active search role (p. II-2).

The mine dog handler typically ranged 5 to 20 meters behind the dog, and the supported unit leader followed 20-50 meters behind the handler. The terrain dictated many of the distances because line of sight was needed to allow for the recognition of the alert by the handler and for safety and survivability of the dog team. The dog handler would mainly use hand signals to direct the movement of the dog, so if the dog could not see the handler, then the directions could not be given. Some attempts to use transmitters on the dogs were made in an attempt to give the handler greater flexibility in using the dog in limited visibility. One such attempt was called the Remote Control of War Dogs (Remotely Controlled Scout Dog) conducted for the US Army Land Warfare Laboratory (Romba, 1974, pp. 1-55).

The major objective of the study on remote controls was to develop procedures by which a dog handler could control the direction of off-leash movement of his dog by remote means in an unrestricted environment. The experiment used tones as commands to the dog. Similar experimental work is being currently done at Auburn University. The 1974 experiments pointed to problems at greater distances due to the difficulties of providing immediate positive reinforcement to the dogs when they were behaving appropriately. The study concluded that a scout dog could be trained to operate off leash up to ½ mile away from the handler using radio-transmitted signals. The experiments indicated that the change-direction command was the most difficult for the dog to learn. The overall intent of the experiments was to create a baseline of information that could be used to further develop, refine, and standardize, “techniques for the large scale production of highly trained war dogs” (Romba, p. 46). The closing comment and recommendation made by John Romba, who wrote the *Final Report: Remote Control of War Dogs (Remotely Controlled Scout Dog)* in 1974 for the US Army Warfare Laboratory, noted, “Command emphasis should be given to the need for improving current military dog capabilities and training procedures with the ultimate objective of providing, at least on a stand-by basis, a proven capability for the rapid, large scale production of highly trained war dogs” (Romba, p. 47).

One reason to experiment with the extended off-leash method of dog handling was to increase the distance between the dog and personnel so that the handler’s survivability might be enhanced if a mine or booby trap was detonated in the dog’s

vicinity. The 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog) had a limited off-leash capability as described earlier, and there were a number of casualties. One casualty in the 60th IPSD, for example, occurred with a handler on his first support mission:

His mine dog responded correctly on three occasions to trip wire devices. The dog made a fourth correct response and as the handler approached the dog he fainted from heat exhaustion, falling on the trip wire. A grenade exploded wounding both handler and dog (White, 1969, p. II-5).

With regard to the 28 Marine BSI-trained dogs, consider the statistics Perry C. Money collected based on his first-hand experiences.⁶ The data that Money has collected based on his experience suggest the following:

1. Number of BSI trained Dogs assigned -- 28
2. Number of Dogs Killed in Action – 6
 - Of the (6) Killed in Action:
 - a. Command Detonation after the dog found the device -- 1
 - b. Shot by sniper – 1
 - c. As a result of missing the device or actually setting it off – 4
3. Number of Dogs Missing in Action – 1
4. Number of Dogs Died of Unknown Causes -- 1
5. Number of Handlers Killed in Action – 6
6. Officers Killed in Action -- 1
7. Total Number of USMC personnel assigned to the project fro March 1970 to June 1971 -- 50.

Mr. Money does not consider this to be a high casualty rate, considering all factors involved. The Army unit, the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog), had a reported 25 percent casualty rate (White, 1969, p. II-5). White's report states that in the case of the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog), there were "no handler losses due to the dog's performance" (White, II-5). The casualties described in detail in the report seem to have been caused by combat

⁶ His numbers are slightly different from those that appear in the "Final Report", by B. White evaluating the effectiveness of the BSI program, which was written at the end of the 260 day trial period because the Marine unit operated for another six months after the "Final Report" was issued.

or environmental conditions while the dogs were not being actively employed. In other words, the deaths were not caused by a failure of one of the dogs to warn the handler of danger on the job.

Perry Money's assessment of the BSI program is that, "You get what you pay for," which was approximately \$15,000 per dog, an amount somewhat different from Lemish's figure. Money believes that, "The (2) civilians from BSI were 'War Protestors', but not anti-American, I think they firmly believed that they were creating a defensive weapon that would reduce US casualties, while not increasing enemy casualties. Long haired hippie looking, but they were there with us every step of the way until we hit the bush." The current programs that are being created to counter the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) employed by insurgents in Iraq share at least some of the same attributes, including the reliance on contractors. But there may be other similarities worth considering as well. For instance, dogs, like humans, are susceptible to the heat and humidity. Supported unit leaders in Vietnam would at times make the dogs walk farther than the recommended distances before working. In one case, a mine dog was forced during a road sweep to cover twenty-one miles of hard surface road in only seven hours (Lemish, p. 203). The overuse and abuse of the dog caused injuries that then rendered it ineffective. At the end of the trial, patrol leaders evaluated the mine/tunnel dogs. Gunfire and explosions caused adverse reactions in about 50 percent of the dogs in the 60th. Some dogs attempted to run away as a consequence and, when caught, "whined, whimpered, and cowered." In extreme cases, dogs were ineffective for 30 minutes to an hour (White, 1969, II-10). About 85 percent of the supported unit commanders believed that dogs enhance security, 12 percent thought they had no effect, and 3 percent felt the dog teams were a hindrance to security and performed poorly (White, p. II-7). Even though the program was considered a success, a future contract was not awarded to BSI.

According to Lemish the performance of the BSI dogs deteriorated as the war continued. This deterioration was mainly due to issues created when handlers began to deviate from the original training regimen. New handlers arrived and each one had less experience and training than the previous one. This led to idiosyncratic and non-standardized personal training techniques being introduced which could only have confused the dogs. (Lemish, pp. 204-205).

Other programs evolved as offshoots of the Vietnam Scout Dog Program. One was the “Superdog Program” as part of the Biosensor Research project. This program was an attempt to selectively breed dogs with fewer health problems, thereby increasing the length of use of the dog along with the development of a “superior ambush detection dog” (Lemish, p. 216). The program involved a range of people from different career fields involved. Nothing conclusive appears to have been published or disseminated about the experiment. At first glance, it might appear that Lackland AFB’s “puppy program” has similar objectives today. However, the “puppy program” seems much more a response to continual procurement issues.

The US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Agency considered the development of “the infantry tactical dog.” The concept was to combine the skills of the scout, tracker, and mine/tunnel dog into one all-purpose animal. This was a cost-saving measure. The program only lasted three month before it was cancelled (Lemish, p. 216). Most people seem to believe that the capability was neither realistic nor attainable.

Meanwhile, what is perhaps most striking is that many current handlers are not aware that earlier attempts were made similar to their current efforts to develop effective programs. Yet, the lessons learned by members of these earlier units could be of tremendous use and value. At the very least, more information about these earlier attempts needs to be collected and the expertise of these former handlers tapped. This should be a major priority for current program managers, contractors, and handlers.⁷

B. CONCLUSIONS

1. The assumption that other militaries will use dogs similarly is erroneous. Just as Japanese in WW II did not use dogs in the same manner or roles as the Germans, even though they received trained war dogs from Germany, the South Vietnamese had a different attitude toward dogs than did their American Advisors. This made their use by

⁷ Although, the scout dog platoons continued to make contributions for the remainder of the war, dogs that were deployed and used in Vietnam were left in Vietnam. The military regarded K-9s as equipment. Only 120 dogs were shipped back to the US. The remaining dogs were handed over to the ARVN troops. The dogs’ final disposition once handed over is open to speculation (Lemish, p. 236). Many former handlers wanted to bring their dogs back to the US and demilitarize them as in World War II, but Army policy prohibited this. Also, the US public was not fully aware of the fate of the dogs at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, when so many other problems were facing the military. At the time, the dogs’ fates were not a priority or a concern to any but their handlers and those whose lives so many of them saved.

Vietnamese/ARVN problematic. This lesson may need to be borne in mind as we encourage the use of MWDs in Iraq and elsewhere.

2. The success of a tactical dog program requires realistic training. The dog and handler must be trained in conditions that simulate their future operating environment. The scout dog training program made continual adjustments class to class based on feedback from handlers in Vietnam, the monthly AARs, and thanks to handlers from Vietnam who returned to become instructors at Fort Benning.

3. The job or task of being a scout dog handler or a dog team operating on “point” of a patrol is extremely taxing. This means that training is even more important so that the handler can concentrate on the dynamic variables in the environment and not on controlling his dog or their integration with the patrol. A dog handler should have extensive patrolling expertise and have experience working with the unit that the team will support. If the dog handler has not had experience with a particular unit, then time must be made for the dog team to become comfortable with the supported unit and the members of the patrol. The particular patrol should rehearse battle drills with the dog team to ensure that both the dog team and the patrol members know what to expect from each other. During the Korean War, efforts were made to allow for this introductory period and this seemed to increase the effectiveness of the patrol.

4. M-dogs or dogs similar to those of the 60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (Mine/Tunnel Detector Dog) can be successfully trained if trained by qualified trainers. The difficulty seems to be determining the qualifications necessary to adequately train dogs and handlers, especially when the military decision-makers lack any background or experience with dog training. Alternatively, some who do have experience with dogs with certain capabilities may bring a particular bias to developing new capabilities.

5. Acquisition is a perennial problem. The lack of foresight and resources applied to the acquisition issue continues to restrict US dog programs from their full potential to save American lives in conflicts. The use of dogs in combat has continually been underestimated by the US military. Consequently, since World War II the maintenance of an adequate pool of qualified dogs and the process to procure even greater numbers quickly has never been established. Civilian contracting or other options

should be explored to determine whether decentralization of the procurement process can provide adequate numbers of qualified dogs.

6. The organization of the dog units as separate platoons attached to higher headquarters may help prevent elimination of the units after a conflict. Since dog platoons or teams were not assigned to the tactical level of command, tactical commanders did not have ownership of the assets, and therefore after Vietnam many commanders did not object to platoons' deactivation since it did not directly impact their own unit's organization and equipment. We should prevent the same from occurring again in the future.

7. Scout dogs were extremely effective in Vietnam. This is based on an extensive literature review and personal testimonials of those individuals who operated with or as the scout dog teams. As Jesse Mendez's spreadsheet shows, scout dogs made many contributions at the tactical level. The more people who can be saved on the battlefield, the more effectiveness and combat strength can be maintained by a unit. The psychological advantage of feeling less vulnerable to the enemy also helped enhance patrol members' effectiveness.

8. There are numerous lessons to be learned about military dog handling from the Vietnam programs. The issue is that there is no centralized source of information on the subject or repository of materials. The greatest sources of information and documents are found in veterans' personal collections. The DoD Military Working Dog Program at Lackland AFB does not have the various manuals or documents produced in the past. At the very least, this material and lessons learned should be maintained at the DoD Military Working Dog Training Center so that current and future dog handlers can review the experiences of former handlers and ensure that past lessons are built on in order to save lives. Too many lessons have had to be relearned at the expense of American lives. The use of After Action Reviews such as those used in Vietnam could also well be of use during current operations in order to capture the lessons and ensure that the dog team training programs are producing dog teams that adequately fulfill the requirements of the current operational environments.

9. Civilian contracting of dog training, such as that done by BSI during Vietnam, may well be called for today, but the training must be properly executed by qualified

personnel. Otherwise, the military risks contracting with trainers and program managers who offer a capability that is not realistic. If dogs are to be trained by civilian contractors the military should release a list of requirements and desired capabilities. If the contractor meets the demands, then the military may purchase the dog. This would require military personnel who are independent from the contractors to evaluate the dogs, as well as to develop acceptable and measurable standards.

IV. CURRENT DOG PROGRAMS

A. THE DOG PROGRAMS FROM VIETNAM TO TODAY

To understand the current Military Working Dog (MWD) program requires some explanation of what happened after the US pulled out of Vietnam. As Lemish comments, the US MWD programs ebb and flow, “with the close of one conflict or the start of a new one. What is disturbing is that the lessons learned are not always carried to the next generation and the experiences of the past are often lost, only sometimes rediscovered, and all too often ignored” (Lemish, 1996, p. 243-244). For instance, the military cancelled the scout, mine/tunnel, and tracker dog teams at the end of the Vietnam War, even though the programs demonstrated their effectiveness in Vietnam.

The lessons regarding the effectiveness of patrol dogs started as an Air Force experiment in 1968 when the Air Force leadership recognized that sentry dogs were too aggressive to be used on patrol in law enforcement roles. Four of the new patrol dogs were trained for the Air Force by the Metropolitan Police, Washington, DC (Kelch, 1982, p. 34). The first patrol dog class began at Lackland Air Force Base in August 1969. The patrol dog was not supposed to be a raging, snarling beast although on command it would become aggressive and attack. It was used off-leash and in situations that were unsuitable for the use of sentry dogs, such as around crowds. The patrol dog was a multipurpose dog, while the sentry dog was considered single purpose.

“Beginning in 1971, the Air Force ‘discovered’ that dogs could be used to detect narcotics and explosives” (Lemish, p. 244). The first narcotic dogs were used to search for marijuana on flights inbound from Vietnam to the United States. The program was soon expanded to include a number of other narcotics. Many techniques were used to get the narcotics past the dogs, but most failed and dogs proved to be highly reliable and effective in this new role.

The British in 1971 were using dogs effectively to detect explosives in Northern Ireland. This quickly became important due to the increasing number of airline hijackings and threats. Other federal agencies soon realized the capability that the dogs offered.⁸

MWDs did not participate in Grenada (October 18, 1983). A few were included in Panama in 1989, but participated only in the military police role. The use of dogs in other roles was not considered. Eighty dog teams were used in Desert Storm in 1991 (Lemish, p. 248). The dogs were used for narcotics and explosive detection and for security.⁹ According to Lemish, Carlo, a dual-purpose explosive-sniffing Belgian Malinois, was quite effective in Kuwait, “During their sixty-day tour together, Carlo alerted [his handler] to 167 caches of explosives, some rigged to explode on contact. One booby trap consisted of a pack of cluster bombs hidden beneath a case of American MRE (Meals-Ready-to-Eat) containers” (Lemish, p. 248).

“These dogs were never used under actual combat circumstances, but far away from the actual fighting and frequently in Kuwait after the Iraqi withdrawal” (Lemish, p. 248). FM 3-19.17 outlines the most recent contributions of MWDs:

In the 1990s and early 2000s, MWDs were deployed around the globe in military operations such as Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, and Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. These teams were effectively utilized to enhance the security of critical facilities and areas, as well as bolster force protection and antiterrorism missions, allowing commanders to use military police soldiers and other assets more effectively elsewhere....MWDs are force multipliers. Installation commanders should include MWDs when planning for force protection and antiterrorism countermeasures....The various uses of MWDs have been effectively employed in many aspects of military police missions. MWDs are utilized effectively at gates, camps and bases, and checkpoints and for random searches for narcotics and explosive devices. MWDs are also utilized for other missions in support of combat, combat support, and combat service support units (FM 3-19.17, p. 1-3).

⁸ By this time the terminology had changed somewhat and the military began to refer to its dogs simply as military working dogs (MWD) along with their specialty (patrol, patrol/explosive, or patrol/narcotic). This terminology is still in use and is included in the current FM 3-19.17, *Military Working Dogs*, manual dated July 2005.

⁹ This was the first deployment of Belgian Malinois in combat (Belgian Malinois had been previously adopted for use due to the reduced risk of hip dysplasia compared to the German Shepherds).

Worth noting is that according to FM 3-19.17, “PD [Patrol Dog] teams are effective on combat patrols and as listening posts and reconnaissance team members” (FM 3-19.17, p. 1-6). However, Jesse Mendez and several other former Vietnam handlers are skeptical of the patrol dog teams’ capabilities in combat in these roles. They are confident in their proven effectiveness as law enforcement tools, but to support combat units creates several potential difficulties. This is based on the training that it took to prepare a scout dog team for Vietnam. The aspects of the PD that concern them the most are the potential for barking during a patrol if a dog has not been specifically trained for silent alert, the degree to which controlled aggression may make the dog more difficult to control in contacts with the enemy, minimal scout training, and lack of realistic, simulated combat training. Combat training, as far as many Vietnam Veterans are concerned, needs to incorporate the supported units and the firing of all potential weapons systems to desensitize the dog to the probable stimuli in a dynamic combat environment.

This is not to say that MWDs have not proved effective in current operations. Examples of handlers and dogs working in Iraq with explosive detecting patrol MWDs are Marine Corporal Paldino teamed with Santo, a Czechoslovakian Shepherd, and Marine Corporal Cleveringa teamed with Rek, a German Shepherd. They were two of fourteen Marine Dog teams in Iraq during 2004. Their experiences were captured in an article in *Solder of Fortune* magazine in May 2005. As the article describes, “When the enemy went underground after major hostilities ended in May 2003, they hid their weapons and explosives in buildings and beneath the surface of the ground.” The article goes on to note, “It didn’t take the Marine Corps long to determine that dogs with highly skilled handlers were needed to locate the hidden caches of weapons and explosives being used with deadly effect against coalition forces” (p. 42). For instance, the dogs were able to detect a weapons cache that was buried one foot below the surface of the ground. (Cooper, 2005, p. 46).

The handlers both remember the 147 degree heat during the day, making the conditions extremely dangerous for the dogs. They said that dogs could not accompany the Marines on 12 hour patrols due to the canines’ sensitivity to extreme heat.

According to Cooper's article, CPL Paldino, "says he and the other dog handlers had a 'general idea' of what they were getting into before they deployed to Iraq, but they didn't know exactly what to expect until they came under fire for the first time" (p. 43). They initially came under fire while searching an apartment complex. Their battalion commander also wanted the dog teams to sweep the future sites for his Command Operations Center. In describing the sweeps, Paldino and Cleveringa admitted, "It was kind of scary because everybody else was stepping back and we were stepping forward" (p. 43). The two teams searched the outside perimeters of the building before entering and then went room to room searching for booby traps or trip wires. Their dogs never found any devices during their searches. On one occasion, their dogs alerted to a blue van and the patrol was ambushed by an enemy with automatic weapons. Discussing some of the other challenges and dangers facing handlers and dogs in Iraq, Paldino comments, "Under no circumstances does a handler unleash his dog. It's too dangerous during a firefight. Too much lead flying around. My dog could be killed by friendly fire just as easily as he could be by enemy fire" (Cooper, 2005, p. 43). Paldino's comments also raises possible concerns for the current "off-leash" dog handling programs, such as the Specialized Search Dog (SSD) programs (described below).

The handlers also commented that they experienced little sleep due to mortar or rocket fire and that they could see Marine artillery and aircraft firing on insurgents in Falluja. Paldino and Cleveringa stated that their dogs, "would spring to their feet and bark when something went "BANG" during the night, but as time wore on, they'd just open their eyes and go back to sleep next to their handlers" (pp. 44-45).

"The US Army has some 30 dogs in Iraq, guarding bases and checking cars for explosives. Zalwski [a Staff Sergeant and Army Kennel Master in Iraq] says the dogs have uncovered car bombs and have such sensitive noses that one was able to smell an ammunition clip in a woman's pocketbook (Meixler, 2004, p.1). According to R. Norman Moody, "An estimated 400 dog-and-handler teams are serving currently in Southwest Asia, including about 250 in the war in Iraq. The Department of Defense has about 1,800 military working dogs in all" (Moody, 2005, p.1).

According to Staff Sergeant Ann Pitt, a US Army dog handler based near Nasiriya in Iraq, "We have many items to help us do our mission, but I don't think we have a

better detection tool than a dog....These dogs are amazing. They are more dependable and effective than almost anything we have available to us” (Lacey, 2005). Pitt describes the dog’s olfactory sense in these terms, “...dogs have 25 times more smell receptors than humans....We smell spaghetti sauce and we think ‘Oh, the spaghetti sauce smells good’....To a dog, they would smell the tomatoes, the onions, the basil, and oregano. They smell all the odors individually” (Lacey, 2005).

The majority of canines in recent combat operations have been patrol dogs. Most have been dogs trained at Lackland AFB. However, some unit commanders, just as in Korea, have bought dogs on their own from civilian contractors. According to Robert Dameworth, the current DoD MWD Program Manager, the best estimates were that until recently there were 65 contractor dogs being used by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This practice of using contractor dogs has since been eliminated. The reasons for not allowing the use of the contractor dogs are numerous, ranging from the lack of standardization and certification to the lack of proven effectiveness that may place US soldiers’ lives at increased risk. The debate over contractor or military-trained dogs seems to be a problem that haunts the history of the dog program.

B. CURRENT PROGRAMS

The Department of Defense (DoD) MWD program is managed from Lackland Air Force Base near San Antonio, TX. The current DoD MWD program manager is Robert Dameworth, a former Air Force Dog Handler with extensive Vietnam experience. His responsibilities include the proper training and implementation of all military working dogs in the Department of Defense. Mr. Dameworth chairs a committee called the Joint MWD Committee, which has the basic charter of reviewing and setting DoD policy for anything that includes dogs. The committee also meets to discuss the training program at Lackland AFB and other training centers.

Directive 5200.31 (7 September 1983) designates:

The Air Force as the single manager for the Services’ Military Working Dog Program. This directive also designated the DOD Dog Training Center as the primary training facility for MWDs.

The Air Force designated the Office of Security Police (AFOSP) as its Service proponent office. Similarly, proponent for MWDs was established by the other Services within their law enforcement channels.

This program alignment has had a major limiting effect on the overall MWD program in terms of its application to military operations outside the traditional law enforcement area (Thornton, p. 7).

FM 3-19.17 states that the, “MWDs are a unique item; they are the only living item in the Army supply system. Like other highly specialized equipment, MWDs complement and enhance the capabilities of the military police. MWD teams enable the military police to perform its mission more effectively and with significant savings of manpower, time, and money” (p. 1-2).

The realization that a dog team is a DoD asset and not a Service asset is the key to better understanding current DoD dog programs. The best explanation of the role of Mr. Dameworth and the program is one given by CPT John Larson, who is the US Army exchange officer, Concepts and Doctrine Branch, and the commander of D Company, 701st Military Police Battalion. CPT Larson was also a former dog handler during his enlisted time in the Army. According to CPT Larson,

It is his [Mr Dameworth’s] job to fill DoD requirements. When an RFF [Request for Forces] comes in he fills it first with service specific forces in the AO [Area of Operations] and then fills any shortfalls with sister services. Two examples: (1) When SOF [Special Operations Forces] requests MWD support in Afghanistan, he fills it with Army and Marine MWD Handlers. The Navy Handlers are not trained or equipped for those type of missions. (2) The Explosive Detector Dog Teams (EDDT) are always on standby for the POTUS [President of the US] missions. They are required to have civilian dress clothes and a passport. When the President moves, a tasking comes down to Bob who tasks out the nearest geographical EDDT who then work with the Secret Service until mission complete.

One more example: The United Nations General Assembly just met in New York. The State Department requirement for support involved over 55 dog teams and a Kennel Master. Bob put that together with teams from all four services.

The MWDs have never been solely a Military Police [MP] Mission, but you can see how that is the most appropriate Branch to have Executive Agency over them. MPs cover 5 Battlefield Functions, and the Handlers can perform in all five (Area Security, Movement and Mobility Ops, EPW, Law and Order, and Police Intelligence Operations). Plus the tie to Law Enforcement, working with the Secret Service, Homeland Security, US Border Patrol, and other Government Agencies. It is this State Department work that helps us justify the expense of the [dog] program.

If it was not for these requirements, the Army would have dropped the MWD program a long time ago! I truly feel the Infantry will have a hard time justifying a MWD program of their own. Even with these missions, we can not justify single purpose trained dog teams, hence the dual teams. A true test will be to watch the Engineer's program [to be discussed later in this chapter] (Email from CPT John Larson on October 12, 2005).

One of the key concerns that some have in respect to the DoD dog program is the fact that the teams become a DoD asset. This means that a dog and handler may not be available locally if the asset has been assigned to other units or another Service. This limits the number of people that some units are willing to send in order to receive training with K-9s. For instance, the 75th Ranger Regiment was interested in possibly training some of its soldiers at the Lackland AFB training center. But their interest subsided when they discovered that their personnel, once trained can be tasked by Mr. Dameworth, the DoD MWD Program Manager. This concern over losing assets or not being able to control their availability seems to be another impetus for some commanders turning to civilian contractors to procure trained dogs.

The other aspect of the military working dog program at Lackland is the 341st Training Squadron. The 341st has the mission to provide:

trained military working dogs (MWDs) used in patrol, drug and explosive detection and specialized mission functions for the Department of Defense (DoD), other government agencies and allies. Conducts operational training of MWD handlers and supervisors. Sustains DoD MWD program through logistical support, veterinary care, and research and development for security efforts worldwide (Briefing provided by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).




Figure 6. Organization of the 341st Training Squadron

The 341st consists of a command section and three 'flights': Training Support, Logistics, and Operations. The flights consist of selected personnel for all four branches of Service, Department of the Air Force civilians, and civilian contractors. The Operations Flight is responsible for the MWD Handler Course, MWD Kennel Master Course, MWD Course and, as of April 4th, 2005, the Specialized Search Dog (SSD) Course. The Training Support Flight provides support for three critical functions.

1. Training Management – is responsible for:
 - a) Implementation of ITRO Course procedures.
 - b) Development of training plans.
 - c) Scheduling courses.
 - d) Managing course allocation requirements.
 - e) Creating AETC course control documents.
 - f) Developing all MWD course curriculums.
2. Resource Management – is responsible for:
 - a) Managing budget/supply accounts:
 - 1) \$600K in O&M.
 - 2) \$2.6M Kennel Contract.
 - 3) \$1.7M MWD Procurement.
 - 4) \$2.3M SSD.
 - b) Training areas, facilities, and vehicles
 - 1) 98 training areas.
 - 2) 70 facilities.
 - 3) 36 vehicles and 61 trailers.
3. Evaluations Section – is responsible for:
 - a) MWD Evaluations.
 - b) Certifications.
 - c) MWD Feedback Program.
 - d) Squadron Self-inspection.

(Briefing provided by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The Logistics Flight is responsible for the procurement, kenneling, and distribution of all dogs entering the program. It also tracks each dog's status for the remainder of its service life. Essentially, logistics tracks MWDs from "Cradle to Grave." As in the past, procurement continues to be a problem for the DoD Dog Program. There is a continuing debate about where the sources for the DoD MWDs are located, since the program buys so many of its dogs from European breeders (Christenson, 1999).

Also associated with the squadron are the US Army Veterinary Services and the TSA's Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. The training squadron comprises the world's largest dog school, consisting of 21 facilities plus six borrowed from other Lackland AFB organizations, over 900 kennel runs, and 400 acres of outdoor training areas (Briefing by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The following figures illustrate the scale and numbers of handlers and trained dogs that the MWD program produces each year. The large amounts contribute to the challenges facing the MWD program. As the first Figure, MWD Handler Production, indicates, demand for handlers has been increasing. So have the requirement for trained dogs overall as seen in the second Figure, Trained Dog Requirements (TDR).




Figure 7. MWD Handler Production (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).




Figure 8. Trained Dog Requirements (TDR) (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The 341st Training Squadron conducts the 55-day long, DoD MWD Handler Course, which is divided into two blocks of instruction. The blocks of instruction primarily cover the proper utilization of MWDs, installation protection, ground combat operations, presidential security, and anti-drug missions. The first block, which focuses on patrolling, is approximately six weeks long, followed by more specific training in narcotic or explosive detection training.

“The DoD MWD Trainer/Supervisor Course provides kennel masters and trainers with the skills to enhance their MWD program. The course includes instruction in kennel management, administration, dog team training, and contemporary employment concepts” (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The DoD MWD Course [which produces the trained dogs] provides both patrol and dual certified patrol/detector dogs [Cost is about \$50,000 per trained dog.] The course is 120-days long. The dogs are trained in either drug or explosive detection. The dogs are trained to detect marijuana, hashish, heroin, and cocaine and must meet a 90 percent accuracy standard to certify. Explosive detector dogs are trained to detect seven explosive substances (smokeless powder, nitro dynamite, ammonia dynamite, TNT, C-4, water gel, and det cord) and two chemical compounds (sodium and potassium chlorate) and must meet a strict 95 percent standard (briefing by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The 341st Training Squadron is also conducting a new course recently added to the training program: the Specialized Search Dog (SSD), implemented on 4 April 2005. The purpose of this program is to detect IEDs in an attempt to save lives. The intent is to develop a dog team that can work off-leash to 300 meters in dynamic environments. The off-leash capability is required for the protection of the handler in the event that the detected device can be remotely detonated. The loss would then be only of the dog. The off-leash aspect of the SSD program is the most challenging capability to develop, but is critical in an urban environment given the current IED threat. Urban environments create a dynamic and potentially unfamiliar set of conditions that can distract or confuse the dog as to the proper response. The more complex the environment, the more training is required to condition the dog and handler to know how to respond appropriately in particular situations, while the specific level of training required will be dependent on the individual dog and handler.

The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps each expressed a need for the program and funding was allocated by the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (Appendix D contains the memo authorizing each Service its funding for each satellite test program). The course is attempting to train dogs and handlers to operate off-leash and may incorporate a variety of technologies to enhance the teams' capabilities. The Air Force course is 93 days long and taught at Lackland AFB and the Yuma Proving Grounds. Currently, the dog and handler are trained as a team and should deploy as a team. The dogs are trained only to detect and are not trained to attack or to operate as patrol dogs.




Figure 9. The forecasted TDR for SSD and Mine Detector dogs for DoD and TSA. (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

“In the fall of 2002, the US Army requested the 341st TRS develop a mine dog detection course. To date the course resource estimate has been completed and we are awaiting US Army approval. Expected start date FY 06” (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341st Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

Through the US Army Engineer School (USAES) at Fort Leonard Wood, the Army began its SSD program in October 2004. The DoD MWD program manager authorized the Department of the Army (DA) to conduct three SSD pilot courses as a bridge to the DoD SSD program with the contract ending in March 2006. On the Army’s staff for this program are subject matter experts from Great Britain and Canada who have expertise that is directly related to the SSD program and its requirements. The instructors at Fort Leonard Wood from Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC) have over 50 years of experience. The program manager for the USAES SSD program is James Pettit, a former Ohio policeman, dog handler, and Army National Guard Engineer. The program is under the direction of the Fort Leonard Wood’s Counter Explosives Hazards Center. The Leonard Wood SSD program also includes personnel who have already deployed to the combat theaters and have captured many lessons learned that the program manager has incorporated into the training. According to Ron Mistafa of Calgary-based Detector Dog Services International Ltd., a contracted instructor for the USAES SSD program, “Recognizing the value of trained dogs in combat zones rife with mines and booby traps, armies worldwide are scrambling to enlist more of them. There are not enough handlers or instructors....There are probably 28 different explosive scents” (Slobodin, 2005, p. B3). The teams have 48 total months of experience and the Leonard Wood program is the only one to date that has published any written doctrine for SSD operations.

The USAES first set up a MWD program in 2001 with the purpose of producing Engineer Mine dogs. The 30-team Engineer Mine dog detachment was created to search for mines in combat theaters. The program is an enhanced version of the M-dog program set up by the Army in WWII. USAES and Engineer personnel from the combat theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan have estimated that they require a ratio of one SSD to two Mine dogs to support operations in theater (telephone interview on September 28, 2005 with Mr. Jim Pettite, the program manager for the USAES SSD Program).

C. IMPROVEMENTS AND ONGOING CONCERNS

The current programs have operated in a similar manner for a many years. Even though, the MWD program has been viewed as being very successful, there are areas of improvement that have been identified by individuals working within the program. One example of the numerous suggestions that have been made to improve the program is demonstrated by a memorandum written on April 2003 by CPT Rick Heidorn, the commander of D Company, 701st MP Battalion which represents the Army personnel in the Lackland AFB MWD program. He states, “Shortcomings in training standardization and organizational support challenge the program [US Army Military Working Dog Program] to maintain high standards.” The current commander of D Company indicated that most of the issues identified by CPT Heidorn still exist in the program. Heidorn’s concerns may be an indication of why some handlers seem to think that each Service should have its own programs. The development of the SSD programs seems to support the fact that each Service has its own considerations and requirements of dog programs.

One of Heidorn’s recommendations was to, “capture and consolidate valuable doctrine form MACOM [Major Commands] SOPs...and to develop an Army MWD Soldier Training Plan (STP).” From Heidorn’s perspective, “the consolidation and publication of the proven best practices will advocate standardization. Enforcements of a single set of certification standards will enable high quality collective training and performance.” This recommendation identified the need to develop a standardized training plan that handlers and kennel masters can use, incorporating lessons learned from ongoing operations. Basically, he advocates a centralized repository for information that can be accessed by all handlers and kennel masters to facilitate training and lessons learned to develop plans for deployment.

Another issue identified by Heidorn has to do with who owns the dog teams after training. The US Army Military Police School, USAMPS, establishes the training and certification for all Army MP assets, except for Army MWDs. This means that the training and certification is not Service-specific, meaning that the dogs are not tailored for specific Army needs that may be different for other Services’ needs, even though training is the responsibility of the MACOM Kennel Masters. Heidorn recommended that an Army MWD Program Quality Assurance Team be formed to, “provide quality

control and standardization of MACOM certification authorities. This team would be able to conduct inspections, training assistance visits, and have the ability to form and execute Mobile Training Teams to update the field with the most current training techniques, record keeping, and preventive veterinarian medicine.” The result would be, “Army MWD teams that are universally trained to one standard, ensuring increased operational responsiveness and effectiveness.”

Heidorn contradicts himself in the area of the need for standardization when he later argues in his memorandum, “All Army MWDs train to the same standards, each MACOM and subordinate kennels have variable quality and quantities of training equipment and facilities.” He recommends that the Lackland program, “query each MACOM to produce a list of required training and mission essential equipment.” Since the units have the lessons learned from the combat theaters, these lessons if properly consolidated and reviewed would provide a list of items that should be standard equipment for each MACOM. The MWD program could then facilitate research into these items and decide what to make available to the teams. This lack of equipment seems to be another example of history repeating itself, given the shortages of equipment for the dog units in Korea. Heidorn points out that the standardized common table of allowances would, “enable a seamless transition of MWD teams from one-duty location to another.”

Heidorn also implies that the DoD MWD Program does not provide the complete education required by Kennel Masters in the Army. “The DoD course does not cover Army specific task needed to lead an Army kennel.” He recommends an additional course be developed to augment the current DoD courses in order to, “provide timely and accurate Army specific training to the field.” Heidorn also touches on the issue of career progression in the Army Military Police career field. The current method of career progression requires Non-commissioned Officers (NCO) pass through a number of leadership positions in order to be considered for senior ranks. Since the dog handler job does not receive the same consideration for promotion as that of a platoon sergeant, many experienced dog handlers must leave the dogs and work within other Military Police functions. There are very few senior NCO positions available. This means that much of the experience has to move on in order to be promoted and is not immediately available

to the MWD program. If the dog program positions were viewed differently then the program could benefit from the retention of its “best” people and technical expertise.

D. CONCLUSIONS

1. The current MWD program is heavily biased to the use of dogs in the law enforcement role. This can be attributed to their long standing use and training by the military police and security forces personnel. The lack of tactical units at Lackland AFB may further hinder the exploration of expanding the use of dogs in current operations. Another factor that may influence the program is “institutional inertia”. The Lackland program has been operational and resourced for many years and has been viewed as a successful program when producing “patrol dogs.” Since the program has been successful some may desire to keep it on the same course instead of assuming the risk of change. As John Spivey, the First Sergeant of D Company, 701st Military Police Battalion at Lackland AFB (which is the highest ASI Z6 coded (dog handler) enlisted position in the Army) puts it, “If the AF does not lose its ‘COP’ mentality and begin to train the teams as war fighters, the Army and USMC will be forced to develop their own training in order to remain relevant” (emailed questionnaire response from 1SG Spivey, dated October 12, 2005).

A dog that works for the military police may not be the “best fit” for an infantry patrol in a combat environment. This issue was addressed during Vietnam by training personnel who conducted the patrols as the handlers. The Infantry already possess equipment and training that are specific to their role as Infantrymen; the dogs used on their patrols may also need the same level of Infantry specific training. According to many Vietnam-era handlers, to be effective handlers need a background and training similar to that of the supported unit in order to integrate effectively with the supported unit. This problem correlates directly back to WWII when the patrol leaders were biased against the Quartermaster handlers due to their lack of Infantry training.

2. There are risks involved with housing the DoD program at Lackland AFB. One is that the focus is on the needs of the Air Force since the majority of the facilities and training environment belongs to the Air Force. Another problem is the potential for “Group Think.” The danger for the DoD program is that the instructors, trainers, and

handlers are all from the same program. An independent study or review of the DoD program may be necessary to periodically assess whether or not “Group Think” has taken hold and/or is affecting the program.

3. The SSD programs were started as satellite programs in the Army and Air Force. (The Marine Corps embarked on a number of test programs to determine the dogs’ best utilization; however, the information on the Marine Corps dog programs is limited.) As mentioned earlier, the Army’s program is staffed by subject matter experts from Great Britain and Canada.

As a consequence, the Leonard Wood program is incorporating many of the techniques used by the British that were validated in Northern Ireland. The Lackland program, in contrast, seems to be an extension of the explosive detection program that is already used with the patrol dogs--the extension meaning an ability to work off-leash to detect explosives. Also, the Air Force SSD program is currently using the standard seven scent training aid kit, whereas the program at Fort Leonard Wood is attempting to incorporate devices that are being encountered in theater.

One concern raised during my observations at Lackland occurred when I asked the Air Force’s SSD program manager (PM), a recently retired NCO from the 341st Training Squadron, if the training at Yuma used IEDs similar to those found in Iraq. I received an answer that surprised me. The PM stated that while the Yuma training facility staff were willing to build car bombs and devices exactly like those found in Iraq, he had told the Yuma personnel to just put the explosives in the car trunks. The PM also said that Yuma would “daisy chain” artillery rounds together, to mimic those found in Iraq, but that he didn’t feel it was necessary that they be that realistic since the dog didn’t alert to those aspects of the devices. This seems quite contrary to the principles of training used by the Scout Dog program for Vietnam, when the aim was to replicate conditions as exactly as possible since no human can ever be exactly sure what cues the dogs might pick up on.

If there are as many as 28 different explosive scents dogs should alert to, then the current explosive scent kit used at Lackland AFB may not be adequate. To ensure that the current training is adequate and accurately reflects the threat, periodic reviews should be done of procedures and training aids. Any discrepancies between the nature of the

threat and the actual training can then be addressed. Ideally, this would lead to more realistic training such as that used in the earlier Scout Dog program that reflected such a high degree of success.

Also, the dogs the Air Force program uses are from the DoD dog procurement process. The SSD program at Lackland AFB does receive the “pick” of dogs from the kennels at Lackland; but these are dogs originally procured for patrol work. This means that by the time Lackland acquires the dogs, at around one year of age, they may have already received some training from the breeders in Germany. The breeders know the criteria that the procurement program personnel use and prepare the dogs for the tests. This means that some dogs have more or less training than others.

Historically, aggressive dogs or dogs that have the attributes to attack or patrol seem to work less effectively off-leash than on leash. This is based on testimony from Jesse Mendez and other handlers. The off-leash dogs need to exhibit more self-control and be more subdued. This problem goes back to the procurement problems of the past: how to find adequate numbers of qualified dogs and then effectively and efficiently determine which dogs have the required attributes.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. QUESTIONNAIRE BACKGROUND

Over the course of my research, through extensive conversations, correspondence, emails, and site visits, I developed a 39 question survey (Appendix E) which was then disseminated via the US War Dog Association and Jesse Mendez. Former and current handlers responded with pages of answers. This is the only attempt I am aware of to capture the perceptions of the most knowledgeable and experienced individuals in the art of handling dogs in combat or in the military. Not all of the responses were from handlers who had been to combat with their dogs, but the insights of non-combat handlers proved no less valuable. The expertise of these individuals cannot be overstated and their interest in furthering the use of dogs in the military to save US lives is inspiring, to say the least.

The questionnaire reflected a number of the issues that surfaced during conversations, numerous emails, my research, and observations at Lackland AFB. While the questions are not “all inclusive” of the issues I discovered, I believe these should provide a baseline of information that may spur further research, exploration, and investigation. The issues that most people regarded as important revolved around training—and the need for realistic, scenario-based training—the eternal problem of procurement, and the potential need for each Service to develop a specific dog training program that can fulfill each Service’s independent requirements.

Most handlers maintain that dogs *should be* used as defensive mechanisms and are essential in Iraq. As one former sentry dog handler from Vietnam, Kiernan Holliday emailed, “I believe that the soldiers in Iraq are in a much more dangerous situation than we were in Vietnam.”

The majority of the concerns expressed by former handlers focused on the training of the dogs and handlers. Specifically, the respondents were most concerned about whether the training of the handlers was adequate for the combat role. The handler, they suggested, seems to be the member of the team whose performance is the

most questionable. The handler has to develop a keen ability to read his individual dog. The sustainment of the dog teams' effectiveness before, during, and after operations is also a major concern.

A total of 26 responses were received by me as of October 16, 2005.¹⁰ The demographic composition of these respondents is: 1 – Korean War Handler, 13 – Vietnam War Handlers, 10 -- Current Handlers, Current Program Managers, Kennel Masters, and Trainer/Instructors, and 2 – “Others” category. In addition, I also received numerous emails with individual comments referring to several questions, though these individuals did not complete the entire questionnaire. Of the respondents, 17 had seen combat as dog handlers in at least one theater. Only one person responded with a negative perception about the dogs' capabilities. He was a former sentry dog handler and on two occasions the dog alerted and, according to him, could have led to “friendly fire” incidents that could have killed Americans.

What follows is a summary of the concerns addressed and raised in response to the questionnaire.

B. PROCUREMENT

Procurement is a perennial issue. Especially contentious are what breeds and breeders to use, and whether dogs should be single or dual purpose. This raises the question of what the dogs are being procured for. John Spivey, First Sergeant of D Company, 701st Military Police Battalion at Lackland AFB, describes the issue in these terms:

...the DoD needs to widen its vendor base and look at other vendors, particularly in the US. The personnel they have selecting dogs for training must realize that we are looking for War Dogs and not police K-9s. The dogs we are procuring are too small in most cases and do not have strong enough drive.” (questionnaire response, October 12, 2005)

Worse is the perception, deserved or not, that, “the Air Force screens and keeps the best dogs for themselves; they recently sold a BLIND dog to the Army that had already been rejected by the Mine dog school” (Michael Landers, a former handler, September 29, 2005). The issue according to Bill Riley, a former handler, is that, “In the

¹⁰ I cannot say with how many people received the questionnaires, as they were distributed through the internet and the US War Dog Website.

past poor quality, civilian rejected dogs were successfully trained for sentry work, but more complex higher demanding functions required better dogs” (questionnaire response, October 7, 2005).

There is a continual debate about dual versus single purpose dogs. According to Captain Haggerty, a former handler, “Dual purpose dogs are a mistake. The Scout Dog is the exception, but they are not ‘dual purpose’ but rather also detect mines, punji pit, trip wires. If you were trapped in a mine field and a dog was assigned to get you out would you rather the dog be a mine and patrol dog or a full-time mine dog?”

According to Mike Lister, a former handler:

Patrol Dogs are dual purpose if they are also trained in explosive detection or drug detection, and they do both well. I am sure you could also train a Patrol Dog to be a Scout Dog, or possibly a mine dog. When training the Super Dogs at Ft. Benning on scouting, mine detection, and tracking, there were some problems. [We] Thought the dogs could perform all three functions, they were not as proficient as the specialized dog. This was especially true when teaching the scout or mine dog to track, because they were trained to keep their heads up for airborne scent, and vice versa for tracker dogs. Could one dog be trained to be a scout dog and mine dog, yes it is possible, but my experience says their proficiency would drop. (questionnaire response, September 29, 2005)

If the dog is expected to perform a particular task flawlessly, then a single purpose dog may be the best option. The dual purpose dog provides an increased capability with fewer numbers, since a dog can perform two roles: patrolling and drug/narcotics detection, for instance.

An issue subsidiary to procurement is what to do with dog teams once the service-member receives orders to leave the theater. Current and former handlers alike believe that dogs and handlers should rotate together. This is primarily due to the “bond” that develops between the dog and the handler that makes them a team. Some handlers who operated in Vietnam do admit that the dogs could stay and work with new handlers, as they did there. That way the dog is familiar and adjusted to the environment. As one individual remarked, “I think a dog that has adapted to the theater gives the new handler a better chance of coming home alive. Mine taught me all he knew.” Others are concerned that dogs need time away from combat, just as people do, in order to remain effective.

Or, as Kiernan Holliday, a former handler put it:

The answer to this question is governed by emotions. It makes no difference what arguments you marshal on either side, the answer is always going to be based on your belief about dogs and people. If you believe that dogs should stay with handlers because they form a “bond,” then the answer is yes. Dogs aren’t people, they’re dogs. We changed handlers on the dogs in Vietnam every year, and it worked fine. If you have a good dog who works well in combat, why bring it back to the States? If the answer is to satisfy a “bond” between the handler and the dog, then you’re back to emotions. (questionnaire response, September 11, 2005)

Jim Pettit, the SSD program manager for the US Army Engineer Center, voices concerns over not only procurement of the dogs, but also about handlers:

Great care must be taken in the selection of personnel for training as a dog handler. A trained dog expertly handled will pay untold dividends, whereas a badly handled one might easily become a liability. Potential handlers must be chosen from volunteers who possess a natural understanding of and sympathy with dogs. Reliability is another essential characteristic of the potential handler; a person must be capable of performing without strict supervision what he/she has been taught during training. (questionnaire response, October 11, 2005)

Overall, it seems the current procurement process is working adequately. Whether the system can accommodate larger numbers if needed is questionable, as it always has been in the past.

C. TRAINING

Beyond selection and procurement is training. Gregory Blaylock’s response to the questionnaire, on October 18, 2005, in reference to training was:

I tell each graduating class I get to speak to that, as a dog handler, I kept looking for that one ‘expert’ trainer or kennel master, or that next course/class that would teach me everything I need to know...it doesn’t exist. We must always seek to improve. The enemy studies our Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, just as we study theirs. And they change accordingly. Getting things changed from the operational world to the training world seems to be a particular challenge. Formal course changes involve reviews and validations and many other ‘procedures.’ We need a more real-time method of adapting to changes in theater tactics/needs. Keep in mind, however, except for SSD we train dog and handler separately – only to an apprentice level. I believe we share the responsibility to make needed improvements with the entire MWD world. What makes MWD teams effective is just that...TEAM. The dogs and

new handlers we train should be paired at the gaining base and trained, trained, trained. There should always be Regional Training Centers to provide “Just In Time” training for those bound for specific theaters of operation. (questionnaire response, October 18, 2005)

Such statements are echoed over and over. Or, as John Burnam puts it:

I can only suggest that the course for any type of training be mocked-up to mirror a realistic scenario one would expect to encounter during a live mission. That scenario should be constantly tested for its reliability and preparedness of the dog team, and its application to beat the current needs of the missions being assigned. The course material and mock-ups should evolve and be managed with the current lessons learned provided from the field in the practical combat situations now being encountered. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)

Other suggestions for enhancing training include: running test scenarios with old versus new training methods to compare them; a required stint at the National Training Center (NTC) or another training center; and a train the trainer course for troubleshooting problems.

Another point of concern is that current handlers have almost no experience training with infantry. This is of concern since the dog generally has to be desensitized to new conditions so that the handler learns to read the dog’s reactions. If the dog team has not been trained with an infantry unit and then has to operate with one on a deployment, the handler may discover that the dog may need more training in order to be effective, yet the time required for re-training is not likely to be available. One reason this is important is that, as Burnam points out, “I learned in Vietnam that once my dog alerted on the enemy, I was nothing more than an infantryman in combat and survival depended on other skills” (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005).

Most current handlers have never conducted long marches with their dogs. One exception is Spivey, who saw combat in Panama. Another individual responded that he marches with his dog monthly on his own initiative. Currently, there seem to be no requirements regarding physical conditioning of the canine member of the dog team. This issue is one that seems to merit further attention.

As Bill Riley explains:

As an instructor we force marched the training dog platoons on a regular basis. They needed to be ready for the hot humid climate of Viet Nam.

Handlers were taught how to identify and treat K-9 heat exhaustion or prostration. A dog team that is not properly conditioned becomes a hazard. If the dog doesn't have stamina it will become tired and lose interest. He may start to slack off and stop picking up scent. Walking point or being on guard requires a full attention. (questionnaire response, October 7, 2005)

Whereas most former handlers were trained on all methods of transportation and deployment, helicopters, military vehicles, rappelling, waterborne, current handlers are not receiving formal training in all transportation methods. The implication is there is no set standard, and that training varies from kennel to kennel.

One of the points that must be reiterated is that training *must* be ongoing and continuous. Burnam emphasizes training, but also the responsibility of the handler:

There is always that little fear factor of 'Am I prepared for life and death situations in combat?' You hope you are prepared and training pays off. But you're never sure until you get in the field and put your dog to work on point. In Vietnam, no one ensured I was prepared. It was not an item on a checklist that was checked off by the dog platoon leader before I walked out the gate to go on a mission. I was just expected to be ready for a mission when called upon. Therefore, it was up to me to be prepared. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)

Unfortunately, as one anonymous respondent points out, "I stand behind my belief that nothing prepares you for the real thing. I do believe I was adequately trained to be trained some more, whether by real-world personal experience or simulation" (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005).

Theodore McCall III explains that all contexts or environments are important:

Dogs will be most proficient if trained in the environment that they will work in, you can't train a dog in too many environments, but unfamiliar environments can seriously affect the dogs understanding of what is expected of it. For example, take a dog and teach it to jump a standard obedience hurdle, once it has mastered it and you know the dog will perform on command, take the dog to a fence that it can see through, that is the same height, and give the command to jump. 99% of the time the dog will not understand what it is expected to do. However, if you teach the dog to jump a hurdle, wall, bush, rope, etc., and then bring it to a fence the very first time, the dog will most likely jump the fence without hesitation. (questionnaire response, October 14, 2005)

In other words, begin with a baseline and add variation to it. This even applies to specialized or environment-specific training.

D. SERVICE SELECTION

As has been alluded to above, and as John Burnam states:

The dog handler is really an infantryman when deployed to support infantry ground operations. I was a combat infantryman with the 7th Cavalry before becoming a war dog handler. I saw plenty of combat and was wounded in combat. During my second tour in Vietnam as a scout dog handler with the 44th Scout Dog Platoon, I relied heavily on my infantry combat experience as a scout dog handler supporting infantry ground operations. It worked and I survived along with my dog. After basic dog training has been completed at the dog training center, I think the dog team should be shipped to an infantry unit for further training. This would familiarize the infantry unit with the purpose and use of a dog team as well as the dog team with the infantry unit's make up and operational capabilities. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)

If infantry is the future "environment" in which the dog will work then this is who should help train the dog. Or, as Kiernan Holliday points out:

Of course, the Marines and the Army use the dogs for different work than the Air Force does. It simply makes sense to train the dogs and the handlers for the mission. A basic familiarization course for all services to teach the handlers how to deal with the dogs is probably necessary. Looking back on it, that was what the Sentry Dog Handler Course did. (questionnaire response, September 11, 2005)

Again, much of this is a matter of common sense and, as remarked on by Bill Riley:

A sentry dog is a sentry dog. I trained platoons of both Army and Marines in scout dog deployment. The dogs were implemented in the same way. The specific needs of a Navy SEAL could be quite unique and not common to other services. If there is a specialty, the best trainers are people with operational experience and understanding of the unique requirements within that discipline. (questionnaire response, October 7, 2005)

E. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are my recommendations based on the research conducted for this thesis. These recommendations do not take into account the expenditure of resources required, and each is intended only as a point for further consideration and research.

1. The current DoD dog program must include more extensive scenario-based, realistic training. Nothing is more important as far as former handlers are concerned. The scenario-based training has to be based on a system that includes feedback from units that have been to combat to ensure that units in the combat areas get what they need and adjustments are made as the threats change.

2. The DoD MWD Program must incorporate an After Action Review (AAR) Report. The report should be simple while providing information that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the current use of dogs in combat. This data can be used as future justification for expanding particular programs or modifications to programs. Currently, no formal system is in effect to collect data. The one page AAR forms used in Vietnam had more potential than was realized at the time—and are worth a close look today. The Vietnam Scout Dog Program at Fort Benning used these AAR forms to adjust training if certain trends became apparent via the reports.

3. The DoD MWD Program should make Lackland AFB the repository for all military working dog information. A library to collect military manuals and documents and civilian publications on working dogs should be created and maintained. The ideal solution would be a web-based library to be maintained by Lackland AFB, accessible to all current and former handlers. Such a library would provide a “reach back” capability to handlers who are deployed. A bulletin or message board would also be tremendously helpful.

4. The DoD MWD Program should maintain a database listing former and current handlers, similar to the database that already exists for its dogs.

5. The DoD MWD Program should consider using former handlers from Vietnam and others with combat experience to proof, vet, and validate the training currently being conducted or developed. The Vietnam War dog handlers have a wealth of experience and many would be willing to give the program their honest, candid recommendations and evaluations.

6. The DoD MWD program should incorporate Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). The MTT personnel would be educated in the latest training, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned from units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The MTTs could then

share these with the field units and Kennel Masters to ensure that everyone has the latest information, as well as serving as points of contact for “reach back” at Lackland AFB. The MTTs could also help guide greater baseline standardization.

7. The DoD MWD program must increase its efforts to educate the leadership of the supported units. This must start at the patrol leader level and work to the highest levels of leadership. Increased awareness will only enhance the program’s ability to justify increases in manpower and funding. The greater awareness there is among the leadership, the more such awareness will enhance the effectiveness of the dog teams since the leaders will have a greater appreciation for their capabilities *and* limitations.

Spivey suggests that:

Large majorities of the MWD Handlers are young, junior enlisted Soldiers that typically do not have the experience level that is required to brief commanders and operational planners on what their capabilities and limitations are, thus we have teams that are being mis-utilized and/or underutilized. Example – A Patrol/Explosive MWD team being used exclusively at an access control point and not being used in a direct combat or combat support role....MWD course students must be trained in a realistic fashion and must be educated on how to “Sell” themselves to their commanders. Proper use of MWD teams must be taught at all NCOES and Officers Training Courses; if officers and NCOs are given a brief understanding of the roles that an MWD Team can perform and given guidance on how not to use the teams, I believe this will go a long way in helping the program to grow and become stronger. (Response to questionnaire received on October 12, 2005)

The program could develop its equivalent of “mod-demo teams” (in US Army Special Forces). The teams could be comprised of retired dogs and handlers with the mission to educate leaders throughout the military. The use of retirees would then allow for demonstration for education purposes while not pulling current dog teams from training or operations. Also, the dog program could develop videos to be shown at the various Services’ leadership courses. These videos would educate the junior officers and NCOs who will be leading the patrols to which the dog team will be assigned.

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APPENDIX A: THE GUIDE FOR TRAINING OF SCOUT DOG PLATOONS FROM THE OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISOR DURING THE ARVN ADVISOR PROGRAM, PROVIDED BY JESSE MENDEZ

OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISOR
ARVN MILITARY DOG TRAINING CENTER
THANH TUY HA, VIETNAM

3 Oct 1962

SUBJECT: Guide for Training Scout Dog Platoons

1. Unit Training. When a scout dog and his handler arrive at their TO&E Unit their training has only started. It is the responsibility of the Platoon Leader to organize a training program for his Platoon and to insure that each dog and handler train daily, except when on a combat operation.

2. Type Training. The training program for each Platoon should consist of the following:

- a. Basic Obedience
- b. Intermediate Obedience
- c. Advanced Obedience
- d. Specialized Training consisting of Quartering a Field, simulated patrols and outpost duty.

3. Specialized Dog Training Principles, this is the most important phase of the scout dog training program and Seventy-Five (75) percent of the Units training should consist of specialized training. The following fundamental principles apply.

(a). The dog must be trained for only one job: He may learn to be a good Scout or Sentry Dog, but never both.

(b). The general attitude of the handler is all important. A handler must fully realize the importance of the work that he is doing. He must understand and appreciate the facts that dogs are used to conserve manpower, conserve life and to further the work of the Military Service through the use of their peculiar powers.

(c). The importance of the handler dog relationship cannot be overestimated. The dog and his handler must work as a team. Once a team has been established, the team should not be separated.

(d). Association of ideas facilitates learning. Where special equipment is used, such as the harness, the dog must learn to associate this equipment with his work.

(e). The dog should be motivated not only by his handlers praise and petting, but also by the goal of accomplishing a mission. The dog can and should be trained to complete a task as an end in itself, not simply for the sake of reward by his master. In all his training, therefore, he must be permitted to finish every exercise successfully, no matter how many errors he makes. The dog must always "win".

(f). Conduct training over varying terrain and in the face of gunfire and other distractions to develop the dog's responsibility for given tasks and to assure the accomplishment of his mission.

(g). The ability of the dog is developed by training during daylight. The effects of daylight training will carry over into actual service at night. Training is difficult to conduct in darkness because the handler cannot see well enough to observe the dog's errors and correct them. But the dog can

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

carry over into night performance the effects of good daylight training. The dog and handler must be proficient in daylight training before any training at night is attempted.

(h). Review of previous training maintains and raises the level of performance. Handlers must use their best judgement in determining how often and how many times previously learned exercises should be repeated.

(i). Successful training of Military dogs depends on the care taken for their welfare. Unless the dogs are kept in good health, properly groomed, fed, and kenneled, the effectiveness of the training program will be diminished.

(4). TRAINING CONDITIONS.

(a). The handler must learn to read and understand his dog so that he can interpret his every signal with regard to the approach or presence of the Enemy's Scent, sound or sight.

(b). Members of the dog Platoon will act as decoys.

(c). Training will be conducted in the prescribed training area. The decoy should not always conceal himself behind a tree, rock or bush because a dog will soon associate such spots with his discovery of the decoy and will consequently rely on his inferior eyesight to find him. He will not use his nose and ears, which are the senses he must learn to depend on. Training locations in the training area must be changed daily so that the dog does not learn to associate the decoy with a given area.

(5). Wind and Scent. The wind is the most important, and at the same time, the most variable factor a handler has to contend with in employing his scout dog to the best advantage. It is the wind that carries the all important human scent to the dog or away from him (a scout dog does not track) a handler must therefore always be wind-conscious. He should learn all he can about the wind "habits" and he should be able to feel or sense what direction the wind is blowing at any time without having to rely on such expedients as dropping dust or a handful of hair from the dog's back and noting its direction of drift. If a handler keeps track of the wind and his dog gives an alert, he knows that there is only one direction to look for the enemy. The exceptions to this occurs when the dog gives a sound or sight alert. A handler must be able to distinguish the different types of alerts his dog gives from close familiarity with his dog's reactions as observed in training.

(6). Effects of Topography on wind. Wind hitting a hilltop, crest of a hill or heavy undergrowth is prone to break into two or three smaller streams. Scents blown by the wind off a hill top or from a man in a tree may be scattered, blown into the air or dissipated before it comes into contact with the ground level. A dog, when he does pick up the scent from a hill top or a tree will lose it once he comes close because it is being blown over his head. The only way that carries scent with any steadiness is that which comes over a flat or even surface.

(7). Impermanence of Scent.

(a). Human scent dissipates more rapidly in a hot and dry climate than it does in an area where there is quite a bit of moisture. Heat from the sun makes scent evaporate rather rapidly. During rains, scent remains close to its source.

(b). Human scent from foxholes or other holes in the ground become borne by the wind because scent evaporates as it rises, this type of scent is not as strong as that from men in the open.

(c). The scent factors listed in Paragraphs (a) and (b) above will determine the distance at which a dog will be able to detect the enemy's presence from scent.

(g). Silence of Scout Dogs. The silence of a Scout Dog is stressed continually in all phases of training and in the kennel area. If the dog attempts to bark or whine, he is told "NO". If a Dog makes noise he is silenced by his handler who will then praise him when he is silent.

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APPENDIX B: THE PERSONNEL LISTING FOR THE 26TH IPSD AT FORT BENNING, PROVIDED BY JESSE MENDEZ

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES SECTION II - ORGANIZATION											TDA NO. DATE		
DESIGNATION												TDA <input type="checkbox"/>	MTDA <input type="checkbox"/>
INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	REQ	AUTH	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	MTDA SEQ	RMK		
PAR	LINE												
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l		
01	00	Detachment Headquarters											
	01	Commander	Major	04371	In		1	1			01		
	02	First Sgt	E8	11650			1	1			01		
	03	Unit Administrative Specialist	E5	71820			1	1			04		
	04	Clerk Typist	E4	71810			2	2			08		
02	00	Support Section											
	01	Section Kennel Officer	Lt	04371	In		1	1			02		
	02	Kennel NCO	E7	91740			1	1			04		
	03	Supply NCO	E7	76840			1	1			06		
	04	Meat Steward	E6	94840			1	1			09		
	05	Asst Supply NCO	E5	76840			1	1			01		
	06	Motor NCO	E5	63840			1	1			04		
	07	Senior Vet Animal Specialist	E5	91740			1	1			04		
	08	First Cook	E5	94820			2	2			09		
	09	Vet Animal Specialist	E4	91720			2	2			04		
	10	Supply Clerk	E4	76410			1	1			09		
	11	Cook	E4	94820			4	4			09		
	12	Armor	E4	76430			1	1			04		
	13	Light Vehicle Driver	E3	11710			9	9			04		
	14	Kennelmen	E3	11710			9	9			02		
03	00	Operations and Instructional Sec.											
	01	Director Oper and Instructions	Lt	04371	In		1	1			02		
	02	Asst Director of Instruction	E8	03850			1	1			03		
	03	Operations NCO	E7	11740			1	1			02		
	04	Chief Instructor	E7	00040			6	6			03		
	05	Senior Instructor	E6	00040			12	12			03		
	06	Instructor	E5	00040			12	12			04		
	07	Asst Instructor	E4	00020			12	12			04		
	08	Training Specialist	E4	11720			1	1			04		
	09	Clerk	E4	71820			1	1			09		
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l		

DA FORM 2952-R (Replaces DA Form 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) and DA Form 608-4a, 1 Jul 65 which are obsolete effective 1 Oct 65.)

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES SECTION II - ORGANIZATION												TDA NO. DATE		TDA <input type="checkbox"/> MTD <input type="checkbox"/>	
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		Hospital	Major	Lt		58	57	56	55	54	53				
		Officer													
		Infantry 04371	3												
			3	1	1										
		Non-Commissioned Officers													
		11020	1			1									
		11120	1			1									
		91140	2				1		1						
		76140	2				1		1						
		11140	1					1							
		00040	30				6	12	12						
		94040	1					1							
		94020	2						2						
		63040	1						1						
		71020	1						1						
			42			2	8	14	10						
		Other Enlisted Personnel													
		71010	1						1						
		71020	1						1						
		91120	2						2						
		76010	1						1						
		94020	4						4						
		76030	1						1						
		11120	2						2						
		11110	16							16					
		00020	12						12						
		11120	1						1						
		11120	1						1						
		71020	1						1						
			42						26	16					


DA FORM 2952-R (Replaces DA Form 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) and DA Form 608-4a, 1 Jul 65) which are obsolete effective 1 Oct 65.)

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES SECTION II - ORGANIZATION											TDA NO. DATE	
DESIGNATION											TDA <input type="checkbox"/>	MTDA <input type="checkbox"/>
INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	REQ	AUTH	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	MTDA SEQ	RMK	
PAR	LINE											
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		REMARKS:										
	01	Grade Not Authorized										
	02	Grade Authorized TOE title change required										
	03	Grade Authorized TD title change required										
	04	Grade Authorized TOE MOS & title change required										
	05	Grade Authorized TD MOS & title change required										
	06	Up-grading of Grade & title Change required TD Auth										
	07	Down-grading of Grade & title Change required TD Auth										
	08	TOE Grade & title Auth										
	09	TD Grade & title Auth										

DA FORM 2952-R (Replaces DA Form 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) and DA Form 608-4a, 1 Jul 65) which are obsolete effective 1 Oct 65.)

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**APPENDIX C: THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF OPERATIONAL
READINESS TEST USED AT FORT BENNING, PROVIDED
BY JESSE MENDEZ**



ANNEX H (Critique Note Outline) to ORT Directive (Continued)

6. Conduct of River Crossing & Sweep Operations;

7. Reaction to Ambush:

8. Perimeter Defense;

PHASE III

9. Heliborne Techniques:

10. Search and Operations in VC Village:

H-2

ANNEX H (Critique Note Outline) to ORT Directive (Continued)

OVERALL COMMENTS

11. Major Strength:

12. Major Weaknesses:

13. Recommended Future Training:

14. Rating: (Combat Ready) (Not Combat Ready):

EVALUATOR

H-3

SFC MENDER

EE5B



ORT
INF PLATOON
SCOUT DOG

34-4131

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 29TH INFANTRY
197th INFANTRY BRIGADE
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

AJIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

TO: See Distribution

1. Purpose: This letter outlines the administrative requirements and general conduct of the operational readiness test.

2. General Description: This Operational Readiness Test has no precedent. Currently, there is no training test prescribed for testing the Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog). This test was developed to supplant the usual ATT conducted and prescribed for the majority of Army units. The duration of the test will be approximately 56 hours divided into three phases. The scheduled test dates and units are as indicated below. Fort Benning training area W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 will be used as the primary test site and area.

Test Dates: _____

Units to be Tested: _____

3. Objectives:

a. To determine the combat readiness of each tested scout dog platoon.

b. To provide the commanders concerned with an objective evaluation of the state of training of these scout dog platoons.

c. To provide a realistic training exercise for the participating units and personnel making maximum use of limited tactical training areas.

4. Concept:

a. The test will be conducted on the Fort Benning Military Reservation utilizing training area W-1 thru -4 and available mock-up Vietnamese villages.

AJIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

b. The conduct of the test will be based upon the following assumptions:

- (1) Friendly forces have air superiority
- (2) Both Aggressor and friendly forces have CBR capabilities.
- (3) There will be live aggressor play; represented on the ground on a one-for-one basis.
- (4) Medical evacuation of simulated casualties can be made by helicopter only at cleared landing sites.
- (5) The tested units and supporting troops participating as friendly forces will be required to operate tactically throughout the entire test.

c. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders will be allowed sufficient time for troop leading procedures.

d. Each tested platoon will undergo the following:

- (1) Combat preparedness checks of personnel and equipment
- (2) Scouting and patrolling
- (3) Ambush and counter-ambush exercises
- (4) Search and Clear operations
- (5) River crossing
- (6) Perimeter defense
- (7) Air assault via helicopter
- (8) Armored Personnel Carrier familiarization

e. Ratings: Each scout dog platoon will be judged to be either 'Combat Ready' or 'Not Combat Ready', in accordance with the following:

- (1) The overall demonstrated performance of the platoon to conduct its TOE mission
- (2) Control and troop leading procedures of unit leaders
- (3) Camouflage, concealment and security
- (4) Reaction to CBR situations
- (5) Demonstrated health and field sanitation practices
- (6) Evaluation of the individual scout dogs and handlers

f. Critique: The critique will be scheduled for the morning immediately following the conclusion of the test. The shuttling of the units through Phase III of the test precludes holding the critique following the close of the test. A written report will be provided to the platoon leader at a later date.

AJIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dogs)

5. Administrative/Logistical:

- a. Actual and simulated intelligence will be played.
- b. Medical personnel with an M-170 ambulance will be required throughout the test. Phase III may require additional medical coverage if two different Vietnamese mock-up villages are utilized.
- c. Real casualties will be reported to the OIC immediately and evacuated to Martin Army Hospital, if required.
- d. Requests for resupply of POL, blank ammo, etc., will be processed through control HQ. Vehicles will be refueled daily.
- e. Supporting troops, friendly and aggressor, will be fed by their parent units; the unit providing the preponderance of personnel will be responsible to coordinate on issuance of rations - only one mess line will be operated in either the friendly and aggressor force area. Control personnel will feed with the friendly force.
- f. Vehicle transportation will be by organic vehicles or as supplied in accordance with Annex E, Administrative Requirements.
- g. Blank ammunition, simulators, and other pyrotechnics will be issued as available.
- h. Control headquarters will act as all higher headquarters for friendly force problem play, i.e., forward observers, company headquarters etc.
- i. Uniform for the tested platoons and friendly forces will be fatigues with field gear and weapons.
- j. All TOE equipment issued to the tested platoons will be with the platoons during the period of the test.

6. Communications:

- a. A field telephone will be installed by communications personnel of the 1/29 Infantry to provide telephonic communications between the control group operations center and the Fort Benning telephone system.

AJIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

- b. Details of control net are given in Annex C.
- c. Communications for the friendly force and aggressor force will be by radios provided by supporting units; see Annex E.
- d. Radio frequencies will be assigned in accordance with Appendix I to Annex C.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ANNEXES: A - Scenario
B - Control Plan w/overlays
C - General Plan
D - Instructions for Aggressor Forces
E - Administrative/Support Requirements
F - Orientation and Critique
G - Evaluation Sheets
H - Critique Note Outline

DISTRIBUTION: Special

ANNEX A (Scenario) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

GENERAL SITUATION

Friendly forces have been operating in the area South of the CHEE (Chattahoochee) River on a search and destroy operation during the past few days. Elements, consisting of two platoons, of Co _____, 1/29th Inf, are currently in a defensive perimeter VIC FL 897766 awaiting instructions on future operations. Prior to this date, VC contact has been light and sporadic, with no organized resistance. Reconnaissance air patrols during the night utilizing infra-red radar equipment detected motorized BN movements approaching UCHEE CREEK along Highway 101 (101st Airborne Div Road) from the Southeast. Additional Intell reports indicate that the VC apparently detrucked somewhere in the vicinity of UCHEE CREEK in an apparent attempt to surprise and oppose friendly force units. Early this morning, two scout dog platoons arrived at La Son (Larson) Air Base (25 miles to the North) and were proceeding SE on Highway 101 to join their new parent units. Due to the overnight movement of VC along Highway 101, higher HQ's directed Co _____, 1/29th Inf to intercept the two scout dog platoons and attach them to Co _____ (-) for immediate employment in their area of operations.

PHASE I SITUATION

Due to the vagueness of intelligence concerning the sudden overnight move of the VC. Co _____ (-), 1/29th Inf is directed to send out patrols from their base perimeter to search their immediate area utilizing the new scout dog units. The patrols are directed along prescribed routes with an additional mission of establishing ambush sites along trails in the area. It is expected that VC movements in the area will not be willingly conducted during daylight hours due to FF air superiority but rather at dusk or at night.

PHASE II SITUATION

The VC activity disclosed as a result of yesterday's patrols and ambushes reveal the necessity of executing a search and clear operation. A captured POW has revealed that a small Nr of VC are concentrated in the area West of the Highway 101 - UCHEE River bridge vicinity coord FL 903748. Snipers have become increasingly active. Due to the increased sniper activity it is decided to employ APC's to move the FF to their search and clear operation. Concurrently, additional patrols are dispatched to seek and destroy snipers in the area.

PHASE III SITUATION

The VC activity within the area of operations has subsided due to the successful friendly forces operations conducted yesterday (Phase II). Intelligence reports indicate that a VC headquarters has been using the village of Thong Lo Vic GL 090918. Higher headquarters directs that the 1/29th Inf conduct a heli-borne operation, augmented by scout dogs, on a search and destroy mission against the suspected village. Co _____, 1/29th Inf is given this mission.

A-1

ANNEX C (General Plan) to ORT Directive (Inf Flat Scout Dog)

1. Planning Concepts. a. The organization of the friendly forces (FF) should be such that unit integrity and control are enhanced. In this connection, the officers and enlisted personnel should all be from the same base unit. The inherent results will become obvious during the conduct of the ORT. Additionally, participation as the friendly force in the ORT is an excellent opportunity for personnel of the 1/29 Inf to receive tactical unit level training.

b. The OIC, ORT directs all information, instructions, orders, etc, through the FF comdr thereby exercising the leadership techniques of the Officers and NCO's involved in the FF chain of command. In this connection, the scout dog leaders are required to advise, recommend, and support the operations of the friendly forces - a realistic function in their normal operations.

c. The FF base camp is required to be tactical in every respect. No civilian cars are permitted. Rations and blank ammunition supplies are maintained at the control CP.

d. The control CP is located Vic FL 885767. It is separated from the sphere of activity of the entire ORT operations in an attempt to keep the problem area realistic and void of administrative matters. It is an administrative CP operated with the minimum personnel. This control CP maintains radio contact with both FF and Aggressor and has a drop (telephone) line into the main post switchboard.

e. The evaluators are in the same uniform as the FF except for should-er harness and weapons. This aids to keep the patrols as close to realistic as possible. The evaluators are all provided by the 26th Scout Dog Training Unit. They do not interfere whatsoever, except in emergencies, in the conduct of the patrol or tactical operations. They should remain as obscure as possible.

2. Control Signals. a. Aside from voice and radio control over actions during the ORT, two visual signals are utilized to halt the action in emergency situation:

(1) Daylight hours - RED SMOKE GRENADE - CAUTION, GRASS FIRES MAY RESULT.

(2) Darkness hours - WHITE STAR CLUSTER " " " "

b. These pyrotechnics are issued to all evaluators and control personnel (OIC, Asst OIC, FF Comdr, and Aggressor OIC).

c. Anyone seeing or sensing a dangerous or unsafe situation is authorized to call a halt to the action.

3. Organization of Patrols. a. Initially, the FF including the tested Scout Dog Platoons, are organized into two groups (A and B).

b. Phase I - Each group forms into 4 patrols each. The aggressor force is divided into 4 equal forces, one for each of the 4 patrol routes. This organization permits the maximum number of dogs to be gainfully employed and tested.

C-1

ANNEX C (General Plan) to ORT Directive (Inf Flat Scout Dog) (Cont'd)

c. Phase II - The nature of the operations are larger in scale requiring that the FF and scout dog platoons organize their groups into two patrols each.

d. Phase III - The patrol organization of Phase II is maintained for this operation.

e. The scout dog platoon leaders select their teams to support each operation. There is no requirement that all dog/handler teams be employed during each phase - this decision is left to these platoon leaders.

4. The appendices to this annex outline the composition of the radio nets utilized during the ORT (Operational Readiness Test).

APPENDIX

- 1 - Aggressor Forces and Control Net - SOI
- 2 - Friendly Forces - SOI

Appendix 1 (Aggressor Forces and Control Net - SOI) to Annex C to ORT Directive
(Inf Plat Scout Dog)

AGGRESSOR FORCES AND CONTROL NET SIGNAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

Call sign - LAVISH CRITIC	Frequency - 48.4
Control Headquarters (NCS)	Lavish Critic - 28
OIC/ORT Director	Lavish Critic - 3
Asst ORT Director	Lavish Critic - 33
NGOIC Director Staff	Lavish Critic - 34
Aggressor Force Commander	Lavish Critic - 46
Aggressor Patrols vs Group A	
a. Patrol #1	Lavish Critic - 41
b. Patrol #2	Lavish Critic - 42
c. Patrol #3	Lavish Critic - 43
d. Patrol #4	Lavish Critic - 44
Aggressor Patrols vs Group B	
a. Patrol #5	Lavish Critic - 51
b. Patrol #6	Lavish Critic - 52
c. Patrol #7	Lavish Critic - 53
d. Patrol #8	Lavish Critic - 54

1-0-1

FRIENDLY FORCES SIGNAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

Callsign - TOASTER CONTACT	Frequency -	38.4
Control Headquarters (NCS)	Toaster Contact -	28
OIC/ORT Director	" "	- 3
Asst OIC/Deputy Director	" "	- 33
Friendly Force Commander	" "	- 36
Group A Patrols:		
a. Patrol #1	" "	- 11
b. Patrol #2	" "	- 12
c. Patrol #3	" "	- 13
d. Patrol #4	" "	- 14
Group B Patrols:		
a. Patrol #1	" "	- 21
b. Patrol #2	" "	- 22
c. Patrol #3	" "	- 23
d. Patrol #4	" "	- 24

ANNEX D (Instructions for Aggressor Forces) to ORT Directive (Inf Plat SD)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AGGRESSOR FORCES

1. Composition and Organization.

a. The aggressor force will be composed of one officer-in-charge, (LT), 16 NCO's and 24 other enlisted personnel.

b. The aggressor force will be organized into eight 5-man teams with an NCOIC, asst NCOIC (if available), and three other enlisted men for the first day. Four 10-man groups the 2d day; 20 men for the 3d day.

2. The aggressor force will have radio communications with each team with all teams operation of the same frequency. The control headquarters will also operate one radio on this frequency. Call signs and frequencies will be provided at coordination meeting.

3. The aggressor personnel will wear the aggressor uniform, be armed with the M14 rifle w/blank adapter (except M60 machine gunners), and wear web equipment with first aid pouch and canteen. Approx 20 aggressor personnel should be in civilian clothing w/weapon.

4. Transportation will be provided by parent unit.

5. Organic unit will be responsible to feed aggressors. In accordance with par 9&10, below, aggressor forces will require 3 meals in the field for the entire force and 2 meals for half of the force as follows:

a. Supper, 1st day - All

b. Breakfast, 2nd day - All

c. Dinner, 2nd day - All

d. Supper, 2nd day - $\frac{1}{2}$ of group

e. Dinner, 3d day - $\frac{1}{2}$ of group

6. Reconnaissance and briefings for aggressor OIC and team leaders will be as scheduled by senior OIC, 1/29th Infantry.

7. The senior OIC is responsible for safety throughout the test, however the aggressor commanders must insure that all safety requirements are strictly adhered to by their forces. The following requirements will apply:

a. No Physical contact will be made with the friendly forces.

b. Blank ammunition will not be fired at personnel within 30 yards of the firer.

ANNEX D (Instruction for Aggressor Forces) to ORI Directive (Inf Plat SD)

- d. No tampering with any blanks, simulators or pyrotechnics.
- e. After each phase and prior to the release of any aggressors from the test site, a shakedown and turn-in of any remaining blanks, simulators, and pyrotechnics will be made by each team chief. The aggressor OIC will turn-in the unused items to control headquarters prior to requesting release of his personnel.
- f. Any accidents or incidents will be reported without delay to the control headquarters. The aggressor radio frequency may be used for this purpose.
- 8. When the aggressor force is deployed within the test site, it is imperative that all personnel do their best to carry out the missions assigned. Nothing should be injected into the problem play that will detract from realism of the test; initiative in adding realism to the test is wholeheartedly welcome.
- 9. The aggressor force will be required to stay in the field overnight, and the provisions of par 7e, above, will apply prior to its release from the test area.
 - a. The entire aggressor force will bivouac (administratively) in the field the first night of the test.
 - b. Upon completion of the river crossing portion of Phase II, $\frac{1}{2}$ of the aggressor force will return with the APC's to the supporting units barracks. The remaining half of the aggressor force will stay in the field and probe the FF perimeter; this half of the aggressor force will return to its barracks upon completion of the probing action and is released from the problem.
 - c. Aggressor forces for Phase III (VC Village) will consist of those personnel released early from Phase II.
- 10. The aggressor rendezvous area is designated as the road junction FL 881772 for Phase I. Phase III rendezvous area will be the available VC Village. Aggressor forces will report to the rendezvous areas at the times specified below:
 - a. Phase I, 1300 hrs at rendezvous point.
 - b. Phase III, 0700 hrs at VC Village.
- II.c Special equipment for Aggressor forces, provided by parent unit.
 - a. 5 radios, AN/PRC 10. (Must be operational)
 - b. 4 each Metascopes for night operations only)

ANNEX D (Instructions for Aggressor Forces) to ORT Directive (Inf Flat SD)

- c. Flashlights, as required - for administrative use only.
 - d. 8 M60 MG for Phase I and II only; 4 M60 MG for Phase III.
 - e. Lister Bag or extra water cans.
 - f. Insect repellent, as required.
12. Medical coverage and blank ammunition will be provided by 1/29th Inf.

ANNEX (Administrative and Support Requirements) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: The requirements indicated within this Annex are based upon the testing of two scout dog platoons with the equivalent of four squads each (8 squads total).

1. Friendly force troop and equipment requirements.

a. 3 Officers, 16 NCO's (squad leaders and asst sq leaders); 64 other enlisted/ These personnel will remain in the field with the tested units for the entire test period.

b. Four 2½ ton trucks for transportation to test site only and pick up upon completion of test of exercise.

c. AN/PRC-10 radios (include 1 spare).

d. 8 compasses (one per squad leader).

e. 10 maps or aerial photos of test area.

f. 4 APC M-113 w/mounted M-60 MG (Phase II).

g. Helicopters (Phase III) 1 CH 47 or 5 HUI.

h. 3 three-man rubber boats (Phase II) (safety for river crossing only).

i. Blank adapters for all M14s & M60 MGs.

j. One water trailer.

k. One ½ ton truck w/VRC-10 radio.

l. 2 M170 Ambulances w/Medics (1 to be used at control CP).

2. Aggressor forces troop and equipment requirements - see Annex D. Additionally, WAC personnel, if available, for Phase III.

3. Control group personnel and equipment requirements.

a. 2 Officers - OIC and Asst OIC.

b. 3 NCO's - Operate CP on 24 hr basis.

c. 2 ½ ton trucks w/VRC-10 radio each and drivers.

d. S-3 Operations Van w/driver.

ANNEX (Administrative and Support Requirements) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

e. 1 admin vehicle, 3/4 ton truck w/trailer and driver (trailer for blank ammunition pick-up and storage).

f. One water trailer - for control group personnel & aggressor force relocated to VC Village on 3d day of test.

g. Field telephone - drop line into main post.

h. Min of 8 scout dog evaluators - provided by 26th IPSD.

4. Training Areas and Facilities:

a. Area W 1,2,3 & 4 Fort Benning, Military Reservation for entire 3 days of the ORT.

b. VC Village (Requested in accordance w/ USAIC Circular 350-1) for the 3d day of the ORT.

5. Blank ammunition and Pyrotechnics - for entire ORT and including all forces.

a. 22,000 7.62 blank ammo in cartons.

b. 12,000 7.62mm blank, linked.

c. 20 Grenade, hand, smoke, red.

d. 20 Grenade, hand, smoke, yellow.

e. 50 flare, trip.

f. 200 booby trap, whistle.

g. 200 simulators, grenade, hand.

h. 20 flare, cluster, hand held.

NOTE: The 26th IPSD is responsible to submit the request for the blank ammunition and pyrotechnics in sufficient time prior to the test.

APPENDIX 1 (Control Group Material) to ANNEX E ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

LIST OF EXPENDABLE ITEMS

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Folding Tables	2 Each
Folding Chairs	6 Each
A-Frame	1 Each
Map Boards	2 Each
Acetate	1 Roll
Envelopes, Large	20 Each
Thumb Tacks	1 Box
Pencils	2 Dozen
Grease Pencils, Red, Blue, Black	1 Dozen Each
Scotch Tape	1 Roll
Engineer Tape	1 Roll
Masking Tape	1 Roll
Colored Tape, Red, Black	1 Roll Each
Tablets, Lined	2 Each
Paper Clips	1 Box
3 x 5 Cards & Index Markers	1 Set
Stapler	1 Each
Staples	1 Box
Message Form Books	3 Each
Rags	2 Each
CP Tent	1 Each
Water Trailer	1 Each
Latrine Box	1 Each
Toilet Paper	10 Rolls
Shovel	1 Each
Pick, Mattock	1 Each
Axe	1 Each

ANNEX F (Orientation and Critique) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout
Dog)

ORIENTATION AND CRITIQUE

1. The tested platoons will be oriented on the test by the senior OIC prior to the beginning of the test. The time and location of this briefing will be announced at a later date. A critique of the entire test will be made the day following the termination of the test. All control and evaluation personnel will be present.
2. The initial orientation will include as a minimum:
 - a. General description of the test to include the test objectives and concept of test operation.
 - b. The evaluation system to be utilized and ratings to be determined.
 - c. Specific safety measures applicable to the test (include prevention of heat injuries).
 - d. Identification of aggressors.
 - e. Control measures to be in effect, (include comment regarding cutting of trees, etc).
3. The oral critique will cover all phases of the test. Generally, comments will be confined to major strengths and weaknesses observed by the various evaluators and control personnel. The tested platoons will receive "Combat Ready" or "Not Combat Ready" ratings for their overall demonstrated performance.

ANNEX G (Evaluation Sheets) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

1. Attached as appendixes to this Annex are the various evaluation sheets to be utilized in preparing the ratings awarded each platoon at the conclusion of the operational readiness test. The use of each sheet is described below.

2. Individual Operational Readiness Check (Appendix 1):

This sheet is completed by the scout dog evaluator prior to the beginning of the tactical operations involved with the test. Another sheet is completed on the same individual on either the 2d or 3d day of the test as prescribed by the OIC.

3. Platoon Operational Readiness Check (Appendix 2):

This form is compiled by the FF OIC in conjunction with scout dog evaluators based upon observations throughout the 3 day exercise.

4. Scout Dog Evaluation Sheet (Appendix 3):

This form is prepared for each segment of each Phase by the scout dog evaluator. The form is prepared only for those dogs and handlers actually employed during the ORT situations.

4. Handlers After Action Report (Appendix 4):

This form is completed by the scout dog handler after each situation has ended. These reports are made only if the dog handler team was used during the Phase. These reports provide the evaluator with some insight as to the proficiency of the handlers individual capabilities.

Appendix 1 to Annex G to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

ITEM	INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONAL READINESS CHECK	
	YES	NO
1. Was individual wearing the prescribed uniform?	_____	_____
2. Was uniform clean and servicable?	_____	_____
3. First Aid Pouch and packet being worn?	_____	_____
4. Canteen filled with water?	_____	_____
5. Was personal hygiene supervised and required?	_____	_____
6. Was the individual weapon present; clean and operational?	_____	_____
7. Were sufficient magazines carried by the individual?	_____	_____
8. Was the individual properly oriented regarding his duties and mission?	_____	_____
9. Did the individual know the current password & countersign?	_____	_____
10. Individual's gas mask been properly fitted; inserts for glasses _____	_____	_____
11. Any extra material carried in the gas mask case?	_____	_____
12. Battlesight zero fixed on the individual's rifle?	_____	_____
13. Was a shelter half or poncho available to the soldier?	_____	_____
14. Did the individual leave any equip behind that would preclude his sustained operation in the field?	_____	_____
15. Items pertaining to the execution phase:		
a. Did the individual maintain himself and his dog?	_____	_____
b. Was maintenance performed on his individual wpns/Equip?	_____	_____
c. Did he notify his squad leader of resupply needs?	_____	_____
d. Was he aware of the current mission? His mission?	_____	_____
e. Was individual aware of medical evacuation procedures in the event he became a casualty; his dog?	_____	_____
f. Did individual dispose of "C" rations waste properly?	_____	_____
16. Additional comments use reverse side.		
INDIVIDUAL INSPECTED _____	EVALUATOR _____	

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Appendix 2 to Annex G to-ORT Directive (INF PLAT SCOUT DOG)

SCOUT DOG PLATOON OPERATIONAL READINESS CHECK

ITEM	SATISFACTORY	
	YES	NO
1. Was all TOE equipment with the platoon?	_____	_____
2. Was the platoon TA equipment serviceable?	_____	_____
3. Was the platoon prepared for sustained operations in the field?	_____	_____
4. Were vehicles operational?	_____	_____
5. Were vehicles topped off and have proper oil level?	_____	_____
6. Was OVE complete, stowed and free from rust and dirt?	_____	_____
7. Were vehicle log books maintained properly?	_____	_____
8. Were metascope on hand and operational?	_____	_____
9. Did platoon personnel properly brief patrol leader on the employment of scout dog?	_____	_____
10. Did the platoon leader check the readiness of his element prior to assigning them to the patrol or mission?	_____	_____
11. Did the platoon leader debrief his personnel as to their effectiveness on assigned mission?	_____	_____
12. Was maintenance of the individual, dogs, & equipment properly supervised, planned and effected within the platoon?	_____	_____
13. Were adequate steps constantly being taken to prepare the platoon for the next operation or mission?	_____	_____
14. Was resupply of rations, water, and ammunition, etc, timely and adequate?	_____	_____
15. Were adequate dispersion, concealment, and cover used?	_____	_____
16. Were strength and casualty reports submitted by the plat?	_____	_____
17. Were proper field sanitation practices adhered to?	_____	_____
18. Were meals fed tactically?	_____	_____
19. Was adequate security maintained with specific attention to mounted movements, during feeding, darkness, and perimeter (unit defense)?	_____	_____
20. Platoon field SOP: Does it exist? is it adequate? Complete?	_____	_____
21. Were scout dogs rotated on assignments?	_____	_____
22. Other comments (see reverse side)	_____	

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PLATOON EVALUATED

EVALUATOR

APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX G to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

SCOUT DOG EVALUATION SHEET

FIELD	C.P.																					
<p>PART #1</p> <p>CADRE _____</p> <p>OPS _____</p> <p>DATE _____</p> <p>PLATOON _____</p>	<p>PART #2</p> <p>CADRE _____</p> <p>OPS _____</p> <p>DATE _____</p> <p>PLATOON _____</p>																					
<p style="text-align: center;">HIDDEN</p> <p>A.</p> <p>1. Decoy: Male _____ Female _____</p> <p>2. Weapons _____</p> <p>3. Equipment _____</p> <p>4. Ammo _____</p> <p>5. Bobby Trap _____</p> <p>6. Misc _____</p> <p>B. Description/or type of hiding place used _____</p> <p>C. Comments on performance of dog teams: _____</p> <p>D. Misc: _____</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____ Signature of Evaluator</p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">DISCOVERED</th> <th style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">EFF</th> <th style="width: 40%; text-align: center;">INEFF</th> </tr> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">1. Decoys: M F</th> <th style="text-align: center;">%</th> <th style="text-align: center;">%</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>2. Weapons _____</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Equipment _____</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Ammo _____</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. Bobby Trap _____</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. Misc _____</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>B. Effectiveness: _____</p> <p>C. Comments and Recommendations: _____</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____ Signature of Evaluator</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____ Signature of Platoon Leader</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____ Signature of Reviewing Officer</p>	DISCOVERED	EFF	INEFF	1. Decoys: M F	%	%	2. Weapons _____			3. Equipment _____			4. Ammo _____			5. Bobby Trap _____			6. Misc _____		
DISCOVERED	EFF	INEFF																				
1. Decoys: M F	%	%																				
2. Weapons _____																						
3. Equipment _____																						
4. Ammo _____																						
5. Bobby Trap _____																						
6. Misc _____																						

3-C-1

APPENDIX 4 to ANNEX G to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

-SCOUT DOG PLATOON
HANDLER AFTER-ACTION REPORT

NAME _____ DATE _____
Last MI First
DOG NAME _____ BRAND NO. _____
TO _____

- A. Size Composition and type of patrol.
- B. Task.
- C. Time and Date of Departure and Return.
- D. Area of Operation.
- E. Description of terrain, swampy, jungle, wooded, rocky, etc, and obstacles that teams encountered.
- F. Enemy, Strength, Disposition, Condition of defenses, weapons, where activity occurred. Did dog alert, if so how.
- G. Results of encounter with the enemy, material or enemy prisoners taken. Action which occurred during encounter.
- H. Miscellaneous information.
- I. Conclusion and recommendations.
- J. Remarks of Patrol Leader.
- K. Verified by Commander of using unit.

4-G-1

ANNEX H (Critique Note Outline) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

PHASE I

1. Pre-combat checks:

2. Conduct of patrols:

3. Conduct of ambushes:

4. Perimeter Defense:

PHASE II

5. Conduct of Patrols:

H-1

APPENDIX D: JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE

MEMORANDUM AUTHORIZING FUNDING FOR SSD PROGRAMS.



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Integrated Process Team
400 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0400

28 September 2004

DAMO-OD (IED TF)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Authorization to Release Joint IED Defeat Funds

1. Ref. DepSecDef Action Memorandum "Joint Integrated Process Team (IPT) for Defeating Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)" dated 17 Jul 04.
2. On 27 September 2004, the Joint IED Defeat IPT approved the purchase of 39 Specialized Search Dogs (SSD) to deploy in AOR to support the IED Defeat mission.
3. I approve release of \$6,960,000 of FY 2005 IFF funds for the purchase and training of SSD. I asked the USD(C) to prepare the required Congressional notification and funding transfer.
4. Project Manager – The entire amount will be transferred to Air Force O&M, the Executive Agent for the Military Working Dog program. The Air Force will MIPR \$1,260,000 to the Army and \$3,000,000 to the USMC to fund their satellite test programs. The remainder will stay with the Air Force. The services are responsible for meeting the program parameters set by the IPT on sustainment funding for this project after the bridge funding from the task force is exhausted. Any unused funds will be returned to the Joint IED Task Force.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "FDR".

Fred D. Robinson
Major General, US Army
Chairman, Joint IED Defeat
Integrated Process Team

CF:
SA
VCSA
JIPT Principals

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**APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FORMER HANDLERS AND
CURRENT MWD PERSONNEL**



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

**Thesis Questionnaire:
DOGS OF WAR: THE USE OF DOGS ON DISMOUNTED PATROLS
by**

MAJ Michael L. Hammerstrom
Monterey, CA 93940

Please Return Responses by Oct 10, 2005

THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE

**Distribution Statement
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ABOUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The purpose: This questionnaire will allow me to collect responses from former and current military working dog handlers, in order to determine candid perceptions of various handlers and the effectiveness of dog teams in combat environments. The point of the exercise to produce a collection of responses that may be used to further develop the military working dog programs.

The intent: The intent of using a questionnaire is to allow the handlers to respond candidly, in order to produce the best conclusions and recommendations possible.

The questionnaire will be used only to determine general trends or to determine specific areas that may require further research or inquiry. No names will be used or connected to the responses to this questionnaire. If you would like to have your responses attributed to you, please check the appropriate space and include your name on the questionnaire. The responses will be reviewed only by me, MAJ Michael Hammerstrom. The responses will be used as a source of data for analysis for my thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Please respond in the spaces provided, as they reflect your expertise. Do not feel limited by the space provided. If completed in “hard” copy, you may use the back of each sheet or insert additional pages, identified by question number. Please thoroughly explain your responses so that someone with limited understanding of military working dogs can understand your main points. The questions are not meant to be offensive or insulting to anyone or to a specific organization, they are attempts to create points of discussion and exploration. There are four short pages of questions numbered three to six.

Please respond by October 10, 2005 using any of the following methods:

Mail: MAJ Michael Hammerstrom

Email:

Phone:

****Note:** The phone response method is the least preferred, but is available if you have any questions or concerns about this questionnaire or other methods of response are unavailable to you.

Your participation is greatly appreciated. Without your expertise and cooperation this project could not succeed.

Thank you,
Michael Hammerstrom
MAJ, U.S. Army

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Do You Wish to Remain Anonymous? Yes____, No____

If No, then Name_____

2. Current Position:_____

3. Military Working Dog Expertise:_____

Have you been in a combat environment as a member of a dog team?_____

Afghanistan? ____ Iraq? ____ Philippines? ____ Korea? ____ Vietnam? ____ Other?____

4. Do you feel that the current DoD Military Working Dog Program is adequate for the missions being required of the dog teams in military operations? Please indicate **YES** or **NO**.

Why?_____

5. What are the current missions that require military dogs in current operations? _____

6. What type of program or course should or could be added to enhance the effectiveness of dog teams in combat environments? If no changes are required, please circle: None.

7. What would be the ideal training requirements for dog handlers for today's operational environments, beyond dog handler training at Lackland AFB? _____

8. Do you believe dual purpose dogs are as effective as single purpose dogs? _____

Why? _____

9. Do you believe that the current procurement process provides an adequate quality of dog for current operational environments and required missions? _____ Why? _____

10. Do you believe that the current method of handler training produces handlers with adequate expertise to deploy immediately upon assignment to a unit following instruction at Lackland AFB? _____

11. Do you feel that you were adequately prepared when you attended your training courses? _____

12. What aspect of your course do you feel made the most impact on your first assignment as a dog handler? _____

13. Do you feel that the Services should be able to develop their own specific dog and handler training programs? _____ Why or Why not? _____

14. Do you believe that current programs using dogs for IED detection are training the dogs and handlers appropriately? _____ Why or Why not? _____

15. Do you understand the products and training requirements of the SSD program? _____

16. Do you believe that commanders or patrol leaders understand the proper utilization of dog teams? _____

17. How many times did you, as a handler, and your dog conduct live fire exercises with an infantry unit? _____

18. How often did you conduct road marches of more than six miles with your dog?

19. Did you fire your weapon with your dog within ten feet? _____ How often?

Was the dog working at the time? _____

20. How much did your dog weigh? _____ What type of dog? _____ What was the
casualty evacuation plan for your dog if injured in training and in combat, extraction
method and points of care?

21. Should dogs be used in theater for the duration of the military operations or return
with each handler on each rotation? _____

Why? _____

22. What roles would dog teams play if assigned to Infantry units? _____

23. What organizational issues do you foresee with dogs being assigned to Infantry units
in the Army? _____

24. Were you and your dog trained for numerous infiltration and exfiltration methods,
such as helicopter, military or civilian vehicle, dismounted, airborne, rappelling, or
SPIES? _____

If so, what methods were you training and what types do you feel you should have had
training in?

25. What is the best method for preparing a dog team for combat conditions? _____

26. Do you feel that you and your dog were adequately prepared prior to operating in a
combat situation? _____

Who ensured you and your dog were prepared?

27. Do you foresee a valid need to expand the missions of the military working dog?

What areas specifically? _____

28. Do you think that the current training requirements at the DoD Dog Center reflect realistic criteria for evaluating the training potential of candidate dogs? _____

29. What roles are dog teams the most effective in the military?

30. What is the most effective type or method of reward for a dog?

31. Ideally, one would prefer to have a minimal number of criteria which could be used as standards for ensuring optimal identification of candidate who have the most training potential. What canine characteristics should be identified as optimal for assessing training capability?

What are the ideal characteristics for handlers? _____

32. What do you feel will be the time required to train an off leash dog team with an IED detection capability? _____

Why? _____

33. Does a dog team restrict or enhance a dismounted patrol's effectiveness?

Why? _____

34. Do you believe that dogs used in urban environments must be trained differently than those used in a rural environment? _____

35. If a tactical dog program was developed to support primarily the infantry, what capabilities should be developed in the dog team? _____

Where should this training be conducted? _____

Who should manage the tactical program? _____ Which Service? _____ Which Branch within the Service? _____

36. Do you feel that Infantry units would benefit from having organic dog teams assigned as part of that unit, at the Brigade or Battalion level? _____ If not, why not? _____

37. Do you feel that the method of assigning current “patrol” dogs to dismounted patrols is the best implementation of dog teams? _____ Why? _____

38. Can dog teams perform adequately on an urban dismounted patrol? _____

39. Were the latest techniques used by the enemy to emplace and produce IEDs incorporated into training? _____ If so, how? _____

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APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS EXPERIENCE

The responses from the questionnaire are the following:

The following are the responses to the questions (1-3) of each individual's experience and expertise yielded the following information reproduced verbatim:

Former Handlers:

From the Korean War, Captain Haggerty: currently a civilian dog trainer and formerly at the Army Dog Training Center in 1956, Commanding Officer of two Scout Dog Units (Fort Benning and Fort Ord), taught the Use of Dog in Plant Security at the MP School at Fort Gordon, and worked as Liaison Officer between the US Occupations Force, Berlin and the Berlin Police Department. Mr. Haggerty's experience is from the Korean War.

From the Vietnam War, there were numerous respondents. The experience and expertise of these individuals in no particular order:

Robert Crowder: the former Platoon Commander of the 37th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon in Vietnam. He has extensive combat experience in Vietnam.

Kiernan Holliday: currently a lawyer and a civil engineer. His MWD experience is attendance of the Sentry Dog Handler Course in 1969 and working as a dog handler at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base from June 1969 to June 1970.

William Latham: currently a computer specialist with MWD experience of two years as Scout Dog Handler in Vietnam, three years of Narcotics and Bomb Detector Dogs, and Kennel Master for the 42nd MP Group FRG.

Anonymous 1: currently a deputy sheriff and a K-9 handler with the bomb team. He has nine years of MWD experience to include combat in Vietnam.

Stephen Janke: currently a minister and a former sentry dog handler in Vietnam and at a Strategic Air Command (SAC) base in Washington State.

Bill Riley: currently inactive and with experience as a sentry dog handler in Okinawa for 14 months from 1965-1966, senior scout dog platoon instructor at Fort Benning for 14 months from 1966-1967, and a professional civilian dog trainer and

kennel master for six months from 1967-1968. He did not deploy to Vietnam and has no combat experience.

John Burnam: currently a full-time Senior Technical Writer/Editor for Information Technology Corp. He has authored the books, *Dog Tags of Courage* and *A Soldier's Best Friend*. He is also the founder and chairman of the "National War Dogs Monument" and coordinator of congressional legislation on Capital Hill with Congressman Walter B. Jones of North Carolina and the his congressional legislative staff. He is featured on a television documentary, "War Dogs". His former experience is serving as an infantryman in Vietnam with the 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division and as a German Shepherd Scout Dog Handler with the 44th Infantry Platoon Scout Dogs form 1966-1968.

Mark Burns: currently a telecommunications technician with past experience in the US Air Force Security Police handling Sentry and Patrol Dogs.

Gene Wimberly: self employed and has experience handling scout dogs for the 42 IPSD in the 101 Airborne Division during Vietnam.

Mike Landers: currently working at Fort Leonard Wood. He has prior MWD experience of three years with the Combat Tracker Platoons in Vietnam and two years as a Tracker Instructor.

Perry Money: currently a consulting engineer as a manager of his company's research and development department. His previous MWD experience includes serving as a dog handler with the US Marine Corps Mine and Booby Trap Detection Teams in Vietnam, one of the two programs, one Army and one Marine, developed by the BSI contractors for use in Vietnam.

Mike Lister: currently a certified nurse's aide. He served two tours in Vietnam as a Scout Dog Handler. For six years he was an instructor/trainer at Fort Benning and for four years he was an instructor/trainer at the Lackland AFB. He also served four years as the 1SG at the Army Det. at Lackland AFB. While working at Ft. Benning he primarily worked with mine dogs, but did some work with scout dogs and tracker dogs. He was also involved with the Super Dog Program.

Ken Neal: a retired federal employee with 100% DAV. He was a dog handler from 1967 – 1969, worked at the dog school in Okinawa from 1969 – 1970, and then was a handler again from 1974 – 1975.

Current MWD Personnel:

Gregory Blaylock: currently serving at the Operations Officer, 341 TRS (DoD MWD Center). He has 8 years of experience as a MWD handler and trainer in the USAF.

John Larson: currently the Commander, D Co, 701st MP BN, Lackland AFB. He has 8 years of experience as an enlisted MWD Handler and Instructor MWD Handlers course.

Anonymous 2: an instructor at the MWD Handler course. He/she has experience in patrolling and detection.

John Spivey: currently the 1SG, Company D, 701st MP BN – company that supports the DoD MWD Training Center. He has served as a MWD handler (patrol/explosive team) from 1988 – 1994, MWD Kennel Master (30 dog kennel) 2000 – 2003, USAREUR MWD Certification Authority from 2001- 2003, and US Army First Sergeant MWD Training Center from 2003 – to present. Spivey served in Panama as a member of a dog team.

Robert Norman: currently the Chief for Team 1 in the Specialized Search Dog Program. He has been in the program for over 5 years now. He started out as a Narcotics Dog Handler at Parris Island, SC, and then moved on to a position as Bomb Dog Handler as well as the Trainer/Assistant Kennel Master. He then transferred to Lackland where he was a trainer at the Dog Training School. He then served one year in Iraq as a Bomb Dog Handler.

Nicholas Fontaine: currently an SSD Instructor. He has served as a PNDD Handler, PEDD Handler, Kennel NCOIC, and an instructor. Fontaine served in Afghanistan as a member of a dog team.

Anonymous 3: currently a Military Police Dog Handler. He has 2 ½ years of experience and has served in Iraq as a dog team member.

Jim Pettit: currently a program manager, engineer detection dogs, US Army Engineer School. He has no military working dog experience, but has extensive civilian experience with police working dogs.

Theodore McCall III: currently an Instructor Supervisor Kennel Master at the Trainer Course for the DoD. He has experience as a Handler of MWD Patrol Explosive, Training NCO, Instructor of Handlers and Kennel Masters at all levels of experience. He was a Shutzhund trainer before joining the military. He was Senior of 3 dog teams attached to Navy Special Ops in Iraq. He also has experience as PODUS/VPODUS protection, security for United Nations General Assembly 1997 and 2003, Security for the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and Security for the Secretary of State.

Anonymous 4: currently a bomb dog handler. He/she has experience as a bomb and patrol dog handler.

Anonymous 5: currently a federal police officer. He has 3 years of experience in the MWD program, 4 months narcotics, and 30 months explosive handler.

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